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In the last decades, debates on foreign aid have generated many controversies regarding 
the effectiveness of aid. While some may argue that giving aid is a moral and ethical obligation 
analogous to “saving a drowning child,” others stress that it is an exceedingly complex issue, 
where technical solutions are doomed to failure. Research on the effectiveness of aid shows 
ambiguous results. Many authors find that foreign aid has generated growth in recipient 
countries, while others fail to come to the same conclusion. Another group of scholars show that 
the effectiveness of foreign aid is conditional on several factors such as local policies, 
institutions, colonial history and the geography of aid recipient countries. This dissertation 
contributes to this research on the conditions that help determine the effectiveness of aid by 
looking not only at recipient characteristics but also that of the donors in chorus. It evaluates the 
role of political and cultural differences between donors and recipients as well as quality of the 
donors in the aid transactions. This study focuses on the effectiveness of bilateral foreign aid, 
that is, the official capital flows from one government to another for development assistance 
purposes, excluding military aid.    
Eighteenth century philosopher, David Hume, argued that globalization would increase 
people’s identification as being global citizens, causing them to care more for the wellbeing of 
those distant to themselves (Hume, 1912). After World War II, globalization intensified as 
countries across the world became more integrated economically, socially and politically (Dreher 
et al. 2008). Together with intense globalization, foreign aid from wealthy countries to poorer 
ones intensified. In the 1950s and 1960s, the rich countries in the West (i.e., United States and its 
allies) became the traditional bilateral foreign aid providers (donors) for the rest that were left 
behind not only in terms of income levels and economic growth but also in terms of socio-
economic and political institutions. This difference in development levels became more salient 
especially after the era of decolonization and the collapse of the Soviet Union, when more than 
150 states with diverse cultures, political systems and histories were largely classified into two 
groups: developed and developing countries. 
Developing countries are characterized with low levels of income and economic growth 
and different combinations of the following: civil or interstate conflicts and wars, corrupt 
governments, dysfunctional rule of law, lacking infrastructure, poor macroeconomic 
management, low standards of living, low life expectancy, deprivation of education and health, 
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limited social, civil, political and economic rights and constrained personal freedom, among 
others. While the developed countries escaped most of these conditions and are characterized by 
high income levels, positive growth rates on average and well established political, socio-
economic institutions and welfare systems, among others. 
In much of the literature, the effectiveness of foreign aid is measured in terms of changes 
in the recipient country’s economic growth. The original rationale for foreign aid emerged from 
a Harod-Domar type of economic growth model according to which more capital investment 
“guarantees” more economic growth. Therefore, foreign aid’s general purpose was seen as filling 
the “financing gap” in developing countries and assisting them in getting on the path to 
economic growth. Later on, poverty alleviation arguably became the key rationale for foreign 
aid. Nevertheless,  the focus on the growth effect of aid has remained important because studies 
suggest that economic growth is the fastest and most sustainable way to escape poverty 
(Ravallion and Chen 1997, Dollar and Kraay, 2000), but one needs to keep in mind that not all 
growth is equally beneficial for the poor (Klasen, 2013).  Furthermore, recent studies show that 
foreign aid is also politically motivated as it is at times given to fulfill strategic interests of 
particular donors. Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that growth models and development 
paradigms supplied by the donors’ expertise fail due to the neglect of diverse cultures and 
institutions in the recipient countries. Thus, in this dissertation, I focus on the aid-growth nexus 
and its interplay with politics and culture of donor and recipient countries.  
There are certainly many ways to evaluate conditions for the effectiveness of aid, 
especially when it comes to microeconomic projects and programs for specific purposes, such as 
vaccination initiatives, monetary encouragements for school attendance, building hospitals and 
roads, promoting capacity building, women empowerment etc. While it could be the case that a 
specific project or a program is evaluated as being successful in reaching its targets on the micro 
level in the short run, it does not necessarily guarantee lasting solutions for social and economic 
progress in the recipient country as a whole in the longer run. This phenomenon is also known as 
the micro-macro paradox. Meanwhile, at the macroeconomic level it remains unclear whether 
foreign aid has been effective in bringing growth and development to recipient countries, or 
conversely, whether it has undermined it. The paradigms of foreign aid, as official development 
assistance, have changed from one decade to the next as most efforts have failed as panaceas for 
growth (Easterly, 2001). While the majority of aid effectiveness literature has extensively 
explored conditions for aid effectiveness based on recipient characteristics only, scant attention 
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has been paid to how differences between donors and recipients in terms of politics and culture 
affect aid’s impact on growth. At the same time, donor policies that can complement foreign aid 
and increase growth in aid-recipient countries, such as those promoting freer movement of 
people, have not been examined sufficiently in the aid effectiveness literature. In the following 
three chapters, I seek to close this gap and contribute to the literature by empirically analyzing 
how the following factors influence the aid-growth relationship: 1) differences in donor-recipient 
political ideology 2) differences in culture between donors and recipients and 3) donors’ 
openness to immigration and temporary work as a complimentary non-aid policy. 
It is not an easy task to establish a causal relationship between aid and growth since lower 
growth and income levels attract more aid. This fact leads to problems of reverse causality and 
endogeneity of the aid variable in the econometric models of aid and growth. In the past decades 
scholars have attempted to overcome these problems by using instrumentation strategies in the 
aid-growth estimations. A variable can be qualified as an instrument for aid and help to estimate 
its causal effect on growth if it satisfies two conditions: 1) it is highly correlated with aid, and 2) 
it affects growth only through aid. However, recent research shows that the instruments for aid in 
the literature fail to satisfy the second condition (Bazzi and Clemens, 2012).  Instead of using 
instruments that would more likely lead to misleading outcomes, Clemens et al. (2012) suggest 
an identification strategy that estimates the aid-growth equation using first differences and 
lagging aid by one period. By first differencing they control for time-invariant omitted variables 
and by lagging aid they eliminate the reverse causality issue. In this dissertation, I follow the 
estimation strategy of Clemens et al. (2012) and use the aid-growth model of Rajan and 
Subramanian (2008) from Clemens et al. (2012) as my baseline growth model. I then augment 
the growth model with my variables of interest and make use of panel data for almost 70 
countries and forty years, on average. The causal identification strategy in all three chapters 
follows the intuition of difference-in-difference analysis, where the differential effect of aid on 
growth in aligned and non-aligned (political and culturally) recipients as well as from open and 
less open donors is unlikely to rise via channels other than aid.  Possible weaknesses of this 
methodology are addressed in each chapter, respectively, via robustness tests on the main 
findings. The period of observation and country samples vary for each chapter depending on the 
availability of data for the variable of interest. At the same time, additional control variables (and 
their sources) differ, depending on the context of the chapter. In the next paragraphs, I 




Chapter one, co-authored with Axel Dreher and Peter Nunnenkamp and published in the 
European Economic Review, looks at how differences in political ideology between aid donors 
and recipients influence the effectiveness of aid. Greater ideological distance between donor and 
recipient governments may add to transaction costs and distort trust between the respective 
parties. For example, if a donor believes in the merits of a redistributive economic system and 
government intervention in reducing poverty then it would prefer to see aid being used to 
promote welfare systems. However, if the recipient government holds the opposite belief, then it 
would prefer to use aid for private sector investment instead. This divergence in political 
ideologies may increase negotiation and monitoring costs in aid transactions. It could also lead to 
lower trust levels between donors and recipients and, as an end result, render aid less effective. 
This hypothesis is further conceptualized and tested empirically by taking account of the political 
ideology of both governments along the left-right spectrum in an augmented model of economic 
growth and aid. The model used is based on Clemens et al.'s (2012) study of Rajan and 
Subramanian (2008) and is augmented with a new variable that measures the aid-weighted 
ideological distance between a recipient and its donors. Thereafter, this new variable is interacted 
with total bilateral aid received, which constitutes the variable of interest. All variables in the 
model are averaged over 5-year periods from 1975-2010 for 67 countries. After following the 
estimation strategy of Clemens et al. (2012) and testing for the results' robustness, it is concluded 
that aid becomes less effective with misaligned political ideology between donors and recipients. 
This outcome suggests that donors should not only focus on the need and merit of recipient 
countries but also make sure that the ideology of a recipient country government matches its own 
political ideology. This also supports the case for better donor coordination in delivering bilateral 
aid: donors should avoid directing much of their foreign aid towards those countries with which 
they are not politically aligned. This can then help to maximize aid's positive effect on growth.  
In recent decades a number of studies on economic growth have started to empirically 
explore the deep roots of economic development thanks to the availability of new knowledge and 
data. The deep roots of development are those influential factors that have a long history of 
persistence and continue to exist due to ancestral knowledge transmission from one generation to 
the next. One of such factor is culture – a complex set of beliefs, values, attitudes and norms – 
that is transferred via parental teaching and/or through resources. In chapter two, published in the 
Journal of Comparative Economics, I argue that culture influences how experts design 
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development strategies. Most of development strategies are initiated and designed by economists 
who either come from the West or are highly influenced by it. Moreover, the economics 
discipline itself is mainly based on the growth and development processes that took place in the 
West. Therefore, the development strategies that are premised upon the western culture might 
easily fail when applied in non-western societies. I measure cultural differences using two proxy 
variables. First, I use aid-weighted genetic distance data, i.e. differences of frequencies of blood 
types between populations, as a proxy for cultural transmission through the parent-offspring 
channel. Second, I use western education of the recipient country leader to capture cultural 
transmission through resources and societal learning. The hypothesis is tested empirically using 
the baseline growth model as in chapter one and follows the same estimation strategy: OLS in 
first differences and bilateral aid lagged once. I use the interaction term of these proxy variables 
with aid, in separate estimation equations, to analyze how a change in aid affects the (change in) 
growth of recipients with larger cultural differences. Results of OLS panel estimation in first 
differences over the 1961-2010 period for 66 countries show that larger donor-recipient genetic 
distance reduces the overall effect of aid on growth. This implies that if parental teaching on 
beliefs, values, norms and values greatly varies between donor and recipient countries then aid is 
less effective. In turn, findings show that western education of a recipient country leader can 
facilitate the positive effect of aid on growth in a long run. These findings suggest that 
development strategies need to be thoroughly revised and adjusted for local cultures. Donors 
need to engage in very long-term commitments with a recipient country and respect local 
cultures by designing locally compatible projects and programs. On the other hand, more liberal 
policies that promote freer movement of people, as well as educational and temporary work 
opportunities between donor and recipient countries can help relax barriers for resistance through 
communication and cultural adaptation. In fact, chapter three investigates how donors’ openness 
to immigration and temporary work of migrants influences the effectiveness of aid in general. 
 Free movement of people, just like free movements of goods, can be beneficial for 
poverty alleviation and development in recipient countries thanks to spillover effects, reduced 
transaction costs and lessened information asymmetries. Nevertheless, it has been harder to 
introduce policies for the freer movement of people in comparison to those for the movement of 
goods. Chapter three, co-authored with Peter Nunnenkamp and forthcoming in the Review of 
Development Economics, is an attempt to evaluate how such socially liberal policies could 
influence the effectiveness of aid. The main hypothesis here is that donors could improve the 
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effectiveness of foreign aid by pursuing complementary and coherent non-aid policies 
simultaneously. In particular, aid can have stronger growth effects if recipients receive more aid 
from donors that allow for (temporary) worker mobility and (more permanent) migration. 
Remittances sent from the donor countries are used as a proxy for worker mobility and migration 
because bilateral remittance data – which would be preferable – are available only from 2010. 
Hence, the aid-growth baseline model used in the previous two chapters is augmented with aid-
weighted remittances paid by donors. Results from OLS panel estimation in first differences over 
the 1985-2010 period for 70 countries indicate that higher remittances paid by donor countries 
strengthen foreign aid's effect on growth. This implies that socially liberal policies for 
immigration and temporary work can benefit both the donor and the recipient in terms of aid 
effectiveness and should therefore be promoted in donor countries coupled with other 
complimentary policies for successful integration in the donor countries and lasting spillover 
effects in the recipient countries.  
Overall, the findings of this dissertation suggest that aid effectiveness can be enhanced if 
the development strategies would be designed and delivered in a way that addresses political and 
cultural differences between donors and recipients, and if donors implement more socially liberal 
policies for the freer movement of people, i.e., human capital. 
 
 
1. Government ideology in donor and recipient countries: Does 





Abstract: Political misalignment and greater ideological distance between donor and recipient 
governments may render foreign aid less effective by adding to transaction costs and eroding 
trust. We test this hypothesis empirically by considering the political ideology of both 
governments along the left-right spectrum in augmented models on the economic growth effects 
of aid. Following the estimation approach of Clemens et al. (2012), we find that aid tends to be 
less effective when political ideology differs between the donor and the recipient. 
 
Keywords: aid effectiveness, economic growth, politics and aid, government ideology  
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The effect of a government’s political ideology on its generosity in granting foreign aid has 
received considerable attention. Regarding aid effort, left-wing donor governments are generally 
perceived as being more generous; regarding aid allocation, they are expected to be more 
altruistic in choosing their recipients.
1
 Also at the donor level, ideology has been shown to play a 
role in determining whether US legislators and their voters support or oppose foreign aid (Milner 
and Tingley 2010). 
 In contrast, scant attention has been paid to the political ideology of recipient 
governments. With the exception of Smets et al. (2013), who find that government ideology in 
recipient countries determines the success or failure of World Bank projects, the role of recipient 
governments’ ideology for the effectiveness of aid has been neglected. What is more, the 
literature has ignored the ideological distance between donors and recipients along the left-right 
spectrum and its consequences for the effectiveness of aid.  
We argue that this neglect represents an important gap in the aid effectiveness literature. 
In particular, we present a theory according to which the ideological proximity of a donor to a 
recipient government along the left-right spectrum improves the effectiveness of aid in promoting 
economic growth. We outline this theory in Section 2, where we argue that political proximity 
improves the effect of aid on growth because it increases trust within the donor-recipient pair and 
reduces transaction costs in bilateral aid relations. As we describe in Section 3, our empirical 
analysis follows the estimation approach of Clemens et al. (2012), augmenting the prominent aid-
growth study of Rajan and Subramanian (2008) with our indicators of ideological proximity 
between the governments of donor and recipient countries. Our estimation results in Section 4 
show that aid tends to be less effective when the political ideology of the donor and the recipient 
differs. Section 5 concludes. 
  
                                                 
1
 The available evidence however is ambiguous in both regards. On the determinants of overall aid effort see Fuchs 
et al. (2014) and the literature given there. The role of the political ideology of donor governments in the allocation 
of aid is analyzed, inter alia, in Fleck and Kilby (2006), Dreher et al. (2015a), and Lskavyan (2014).  
14 
 
1.2. A theory of ideological proximity and aid effectiveness 
Ideological proximity in the foreign aid literature  
According to Milner and Tingley (2010: 227), “Interests matter, but so does ideology” when 
explaining the votes of (US) legislators in favor of or against aid. In other words, legislators 
supporting aid do not only respond to the material interests of their constituencies or national 
strategic interests, but also to the ideological predisposition of their voters. In this paper, we 
argue that ideology is an important determinant of the effectiveness of aid. More specifically, we 
hypothesize that the ideological proximity of donor and recipient governments increases the 
chance that aid will affect growth in the recipient country positively. 
Previous literature on the effectiveness of aid focuses on the recipient countries’ quality of 
governance, institutions, and economic policies to explain differences in effectiveness between 
countries (e.g., Burnside and Dollar 2000, Rajan and Subramanian 2008). A fairly extensive 
literature addresses the question of whether and how donors use aid as a means of rewarding 
political allies and buying political support from recipient countries. Thacker (1999) introduces 
the ‘political proximity’ hypothesis according to which political friends of major shareholders of 
international financial institutions are more likely to receive financial support than political 
enemies. At the same time, Thacker (1999) proposes a more dynamic ‘political movement’ 
hypothesis according to which less closely aligned recipient countries are still rewarded if they 
move towards the major shareholders’ political position. Political proximity or movement in 
Thacker’s reasoning relates to foreign policy affinity as revealed by UNGA voting patterns. 
Financial support between politically allied donors and recipients is also the focus of recent 
studies such as Stone (2004), Carter and Stone (2015) and Vreeland and Dreher (2014). Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith (2009: 315) model the interplay of donors and recipients as “the granting of 
policy concessions by the recipient in exchange for cash (or in-kind) transfers by the donor.” 




In contrast, ideological proximity along the left-right axis of the governments of the donor 
and recipient country has received scant attention in the literature on aid effectiveness. Smets et 
al. (2013) show that government ideology in recipient countries determines the success or failure 
                                                 
2
 See also Headey (2008) and Bearce and Tirone (2010).  
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of World Bank projects. They find that the quality of loans from the Bank is higher when the 
recipient country has a left-wing government, and that left-wing governments comply more fully 
with World Bank conditions. The World Bank is widely considered to be a ‘conservative’ bastion 
of the so-called Washington Consensus of business-friendly reforms. At other times, however, 
the Bank pushed issues that are more associated with the left – such as poverty reduction, better 
provision of social services, gender equality, and environmental conservation. Hence, it is hard to 
position the Bank along the ideological left-right axis of national governments. What is more, 
Smets et al. (2013) do not assess the growth effects of aid. To the best of our knowledge, our 
paper is the first to address ideological proximity within donor-recipient pairs, in terms of 
ideological orientation of the two governments, and to assess its effects on aid-induced growth in 
the recipient country.  
The simple model depicted in Figure A1 in Appendix A portrays our theory on how 
ideological proximity within a donor-recipient pair changes the effectiveness of foreign aid. First, 
we argue that ideological proximity improves aid effectiveness by increasing trust within the 
donor-recipient pair. Second, we hypothesize that ideological proximity improves aid 
effectiveness by reducing transaction costs in bilateral aid relations. We discuss both transmission 
mechanisms in the following. 
 
Ideological proximity, trust, and aid effectiveness 
Before turning to the question of how ideological proximity increases trust between governments 
within a donor-recipient pair, we draw on the extensive literature revealing the effects of trust of 
various outcome variables. This literature offers relevant insights, even though it has rarely 
addressed aid effectiveness and the exact meaning and measurement of trust is clearly 
contextual.
3
 In business economics, trust has repeatedly been identified as an important 
determinant of firm performance. For instance, Costa e Silva et al. (2012: 293) analyze the trust-
performance relationship in international firm alliances and find “a strong and positive effect.” 
Focusing on firms in India, Pakistan, Poland, and the United Kingdom, Jiang et al. (2011) 
conclude that trust helps build relationships with long-term perspectives in international business 
                                                 
3
 It should be stressed at this point already that trust between governments, as introduced in Figure A1,  is 
unobservable in our subsequent empirical analysis. Consequently, we do not aim at identifying and separating the 
effects of trust between governments on aid effectiveness, relative to other transmission channels such as transaction 
costs in our empirical analysis. 
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markets. Firm-level studies also find positive indirect effects of trust, working via transaction 
costs, on information sharing and information quality among supply chain partners (e.g., Dyer 
and Chu 2003).  
More closely related to the present macroeconomic context, it has been shown that “lower 
bilateral trust leads to less trade between two countries, less portfolio investment, and less direct 
investment” (Guiso et al. 2009: 1095). According to several studies, trust has positive effects on 
investment, growth and productivity (Zak and Knack 2001, Algan and Cahuc 2010, Bjørnskov 
and Méon 2013). Finally, Rathbun (2011) argues that trust encourages international cooperation. 
More precisely, Rathbun (2011: 243 and 268) refers to generalized trust as “an ideological belief 
about the trustworthiness of others” which allows for “cooperation in situations about which 
rationalists would be pessimistic and without the price that rationalists would expect.” 
In regards to aid effectiveness, mistrust between governments in a donor-recipient pair 
has adverse effects in an indirect way by increasing transaction costs (Figure A1). A lack of trust 
appears to be associated with dysfunctional bureaucratic and political behavior (see also Bigsten 
2006). As indicated in Figure A1, the effect of trust on transaction costs can also work through 
the composition of aid. As shown in Bermeo (2010), the composition of aid indeed depends on 
the strengths of existing ties between donors and recipients. She also shows that the amount of 
aid given depends on the recipient’s capacity to use the aid. Unless donors are confident that 
recipients use aid productively, they tend to prefer a hands-on approach and disburse aid “in the 
form of hundreds of separate donor-managed projects” (Knack and Rahman 2007: 177), rather 
than in the form of general budget support and program-based approaches. In other words, a 
lower degree of trust would be associated with a higher share of project-specific support in the 
total aid received.
4
 Aid divided into many packets involves considerable transaction costs related 
to intensive negotiation and distinct management and reporting requirements (Acharya et al. 
2006: 6). It also adds to poaching, i.e., donors absorbing talented local staff to improve their own 
project-related management and control – even though this often crowds out more productive 
local development activities (Knack and Rahman 2007). In contrast to project-specific aid, 
general budget support is widely believed to reduce transaction costs. According to Koeberle and 
                                                 
4
 The analysis of different aid allocation channels by Dietrich (2013) suggests that the share of government-to-
government transfers of aid generally declines under such conditions, in favor of aid channeled through non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). However, such a shift could also result in relatively high transaction costs 
(Acharya et al. 2006).  
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Stavreski (2006: 21), “reduction of transaction costs is one of the key objectives of providing 
budget support. Compared to other aid modalities, the expectation is that budget support reduces 
the need for separate audits, project management, or implementation planning.”
5
  
A lack of trust and disparate views on how to use aid are also likely to impair aid 
effectiveness by giving rise to incentive problems with regard to conditionality. Donors feel 
compelled to impose detailed conditions to justify aid to their political constituency at home, 
even though conditionality often fails to work (e.g., Collier 1997, Vreeland 2006). Recipients are 
particularly tempted under such conditions to evade conditionality by diverting aid. As a result, 
the effectiveness of aid is reduced by time-consuming and resource-absorbing negotiations over 
reform programs and control mechanisms to ensure better compliance. Conversely, greater trust 
encourages the decentralization of responsibility for aid programming to the recipient country 
level. According to Clay et al. (2008), such a decentralization of responsibility is closely linked 
with the untying of aid. Tied aid is generally seen as less effective and efficient.
6
 To the extent 
that trusting donors untie their aid, such changes in the composition of aid would increase its 
effect on growth. 
Compared to the effects of trust on aid effectiveness, it may be less obvious how 
ideological proximity increases trust within a donor-recipient pair. All the same, it can be 
plausibly argued that ideological proximity renders it easier to trust a partner country as common 
ideological beliefs narrow the range of possible contingencies and limit the scope of opportunistic 
behavior. Cheating is less likely in pairs of ideologically closer countries than in pairs of 
ideologically distant ones.
7
 Borrowing from Rathbun (2011: 244), ideological proximity can be 
considered to be “part of a belief system, a particular way of looking at the world,” which makes 
partner countries believe “that others are largely trustworthy.” Ideological proximity thereby 
reduces problems of asymmetric information and the associated problems of writing complete 
and enforceable contracts, i.e., problems that are widely perceived to hinder mutually beneficial 
                                                 
5
 Lawson et al. (2003: 11) note: “Countries with a large number of projects and multiple donors each with their own 
reporting and accounting requirements face high transaction costs in the delivery of aid. In contrast, GBS [general 
budget support] can be managed and monitored through a single multi-donor process, allowing senior government 
officials to devote time to policy making, instead of dealing with large number of individual project missions.” 
Extensive evaluation reports tend to support this view (Lawson et al. 2003, Lister and Carter 2006). Importantly, 
however, for general budget support to reduce transaction costs, governance and institutions in the recipient country 
would have to be sufficiently developed (Cordella and Dell'Ariccia 2007, Dietrich 2013). 
6
 See Clay et al. (2008) and the literature cited there. 
7
 See also Zak and Knack (2001: 317) who show in a principal-agent model that “cheating is more likely (and trust is 
therefore lower) when the social distance between agents is larger.” 
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economic transactions (see Spring and Grossmann 2013 and the literature given there). 
International associations of like-minded political parties, including the Socialist International 
and the International Democrat Union, as well as political foundations engaged in development 
cooperation and aid, offer specific conduits through which such problems may be contained and 
trust can be built.
8
 
The plausibility of our theoretical reasoning is underscored by previous empirical studies 
on the effects of trust on international trade and investment. In particular, Guiso et al. (2009) 
include a measure of religious proximity of partner countries to account for the endogenous 
nature of trust. The underlying argument, similar to the reasoning above, is that religious 
proximity shapes common beliefs and thereby increases trust. Religious beliefs of the people in a 
pair of partner countries may be particularly relevant for identifying the impact of trust on private 
sector transactions such as trade and investment.
9
 In contrast, beliefs related to the political 





Ideological proximity, transaction costs, and aid effectiveness 
Recent research as well as various political initiatives to reform the aid system clearly point to the 
adverse effects of higher transaction costs on aid effectiveness. In scholarly debate, high 
transaction costs related to the delivery and management of aid are widely viewed “as detracting 
from aid’s value” (Knack and Rahman 2007: 178). As noted by Bigsten (2006), the view that the 
costs of transferring aid render it ineffective can be traced back to Bauer (1971: 99): “It is by no 
means unusual for projects to absorb domestic inputs of greater value than net output, especially 
when the cost of administering the projects … is also considered.” More recently, Kanbur (2006: 
1579) observed that the mechanisms adopted by donors to track and monitor aid flows “are very 
intensive in terms of recipient capacity.” 
                                                 
8
 For instance, the Socialist International “works intensively throughout the year to strengthen and develop social 
democratic policies in the world” (http://www.socialistinternational.org/). The International Democrat Union 
“provides a forum in which political parties holding similar beliefs … act cooperatively, establish contacts, and 
present a unified voice toward the promotion of centre-right policies across the globe” (http://www.idu.org/). 
9
 In the study of Costa e Silva et al. (2012: 293) on international business alliances, “shared values” in terms of 
common motives and objectives are among the “key antecedents identified as significant influencers on trust.” 
10
 In another strand of related literature, Fischer (2011) finds that personal trust in political institutions is higher if the 
government’s ideology matches with personal political leanings.  
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These insights have led to political initiatives such as the so-called Paris Declaration of 
2005 in which donors and recipients committed themselves to render aid more effective. The 
Paris Declaration lists various aspects of misaligned donor-recipient relations giving rise to 
higher transaction costs.
11
 For instance, it states that donors have traditionally been reluctant to 
“respect partner country leadership” and “base their overall support on partner countries’ national 
development strategies, institutions and procedures” (paragraphs 15 and 16). Furthermore, 
partner countries and donors have often failed to “work together to establish mutually agreed 
frameworks that provide reliable assessments of performance” (paragraph 19). The subsequent 
Accra Agenda for Action of 2008 reiterated previous commitments, including the call on donors 
to “work with developing countries to agree on a limited set of mutually agreed conditions based 
on national development strategies” (paragraph 25). 
In light of scholarly insights and political commitments, one may wonder why high 
transaction costs continue to impair the effectiveness of aid. We are not aware of any 
comprehensive assessments of this question. The OECD’s own monitoring of the Paris 
Declaration indicates that progress in implementing the proposals for reducing transaction costs 
has remained modest and partial at best, but the OECD’s monitoring hardly addresses the reasons 
for persistent implementation deficits.
12
 In the following, we argue that diverging political 
ideology contributes to misaligned donor-recipient relationships and increases the associated 
transaction costs of the delivery and management of aid. 
As noted by Milner and Tingley (2010), it is widely accepted that political ideology 
shapes aid policy. Focusing on the traditional left-right political divide, the left is commonly 
assumed to rely on government intervention in order to achieve a less unequal distribution of 
income and wealth and alleviate absolute poverty; the right is commonly assumed to rely on 
markets, individual effort and private business to promote economic growth. Accordingly, 
ideological distance within a donor-recipient pair implies that the left-wing member of the pair 
holds the belief that aid should primarily be used as a means of redistribution and poverty 
alleviation, while the right-wing member holds the belief that aid, if deemed necessary at all, 
should ultimately promote private sector development. Clearly, negotiating aid programs and 
projects is more difficult, time-consuming, and costly when the donor and the recipient hold such 
                                                 
11
 For details, see http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf (accessed: June 2013). 
12
 For details, see the 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration 
(http://www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/41202121.pdf; accessed: June 2013). 
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diverging views on the major purposes of aid transfers. In contrast, transaction costs tend to be 
lower when ideologically closer donor-recipient pairs fundamentally agree ex ante on the major 
objectives aid might help achieve.  
In addition, ideological proximity also helps reduce transaction costs ex post, i.e., after an 
aid transfer is made. If the donor and recipient agree beforehand on how aid should principally be 
used, the recipient has less reason to evade donor conditions ex post and enforce his own 
priorities by exploiting the fungibility of aid and redirecting local funds to preferred uses. The 
donor would then have less reason to spend resources on extensive monitoring in order to avoid 
being cheated by ideologically distant recipients after the aid transfer has been made.
13
 Less 
intrusive monitoring of aid relations between ideologically closer donors and recipients could 
reduce so-called ‘phantom aid’ (ActionAid International 2005: 17) and, correspondingly, increase 
the share of aid that can actually be used productively in the recipient country. 
In both stages, before and after an aid transfer, ideological proximity within a pair renders 
it easier for the donor to meet the above-noted requirements that the Paris Declaration deems 
necessary to reduce aid-related transaction costs. Specifically, donors will find it easier to 
“respect partner country leadership” and “base their overall support on partner countries’ national 
development strategies, institutions and procedures” (paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Paris 
Declaration) in pairs with ideologically closer recipients. Also, it becomes more likely in such 
pairs that donors will “work with developing countries to agree on a limited set of mutually 
agreed conditions based on national development strategies” (paragraph 25 of the Accra Agenda 
for Action). Note that the above reasoning on ideological proximity and aid-related transaction 
costs resembles the notion of (cultural) proximity commonly applied in gravity-type models on 
bilateral trade and foreign direct investment. These models routinely use manifestations of 
cultural proximity – e.g., in terms of common language, religion, and legal systems – to account 
for transaction costs within pairs of trading or investment partners (e.g., Elkins et al. 2006). The 
ideological proximity of governments may play a minor role in capturing transaction costs in 
private-sector exchanges related to trade and investment, but is likely to figure prominently in 
government-to-government transfers of official aid. 
 
  
                                                 
13
 For a similar line of reasoning see Bjørnskov and Méon (2013). 
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Refinement and qualifications 
The theoretical framework outlined so far applies to different manifestations of ideological 
distance between donor and recipient governments. Lack of trust and high transaction costs 
impair the effectiveness of aid regardless of which government in a donor-recipient pair is on the 
left or right of the ideological spectrum. Nevertheless, one might suspect that incentive problems 
are particularly pronounced when the donor is left-wing while the recipient is right-wing. Azam 
and Laffont (2003) model aid as a contract where the donor government transfers aid in return for 
poverty reduction by the recipient government. In contrast to the donor who is assumed to be 
purely altruistic, the recipient government also cares for the welfare of the ruling elite. Likewise, 
Torsvik (2005) assumes donors to be ‘poverty averse.’ Governments in the recipient country can 
strategically exploit the altruism of donors by diverting funds from poverty alleviation efforts to 
the local elite. Arguably, the likelihood that the effectiveness of aid suffers from such diversion is 
particularly high with principal-agent problems between a left-wing donor and a right-wing 
recipient. 
 Furthermore, ideological proximity does not necessarily have the same effects on the 
growth-impact of aid when it comes to aligned left-wing pairs or, alternatively, aligned right-
wing pairs. As noted above, left-wing governments are commonly assumed to aim at a fair 
distribution of income and wealth, while right-wing governments tend to favor private-sector 
development over redistribution. Consequently, proximity at opposite ends of the ideological 
spectrum can be expected to be associated with a different composition of aid (see Figure A1): 
Proximity at the left would imply a higher share of aid in social sectors such as education, health, 
and water and sanitation; proximity at the right would imply a higher share of aid in production 
sectors and business-related infrastructure. The different composition of aid may, in turn, 
influence the effectiveness of aid, e.g., if the growth effects of early-impact aid in the area of 
physical infrastructure are more immediate than the growth effects of aid aimed at improved 
social services delivery (Clemens et al. 2012).
14
 
                                                 
14
 However, other studies show that early-impact aid is not a robust predictor of growth (Rajan and Subramanian 
2008, Bjørnskov 2013). A major drawback with this measure is that disaggregated aid disbursements are not 
available for the entire period, so that disbursements have to be estimated based on commitments. Data on 
commitments in the earlier periods suffer from severe underreporting, too, however, which is not addressed in 




Our main hypothesis that ideological proximity of donor and recipient governments 
improves the effectiveness of aid also needs to be qualified insofar as aid relations between 
ideologically close donor-recipient pairs may encourage favoritism.
15
 The effectiveness of aid in 
promoting economic development would be impaired to the extent that funds are diverted from 
more deserving recipients to ideologically favored ones.
16
 If donors systematically allocated more 
aid to recipients of the same ideological orientation, the effectiveness of aid would suffer from 
declining marginal returns, compared to a selection of aid projects that is not biased by 
ideological proximity and based on expected marginal returns exclusively.
17
 What is more, for 
any given amount of aid, ideologically close recipients may be able to extract projects that would 
otherwise not be granted because of quality concerns, further reducing the effectiveness of aid. 
If ideologically motivated favoritism dominates the politicians’ utility function, less effort 
might be spent on the ground to promote developmental objectives. Favoritism might thus allow 
projects to be pursued where important preconditions are not met or might reduce time and 
resources devoted to the preparation of a project (Kilby 2013, 2015). On the donor side, 
bureaucrats may not interfere with their political masters’ preference for ideologically aligned 
recipient governments, as that might threaten the advancement of their careers in the aid 
agencies. From the recipients’ perspective, aid inflows from ideologically aligned donor 
governments could be anticipated to persist even if important policy reforms to promote 
economic growth were delayed. In addition, ideologically aligned donor governments may 
continue to deliver aid through government-to-government transfers, even though bypassing 
recipient governments and delivering aid through NGOs could improve the effectiveness of aid 
under conditions of bad governance and weak institutions (Dietrich 2013).  
Faye and Niehaus (2012) discuss another channel through which ideological proximity 
between the donor and the recipient could reduce the effectiveness of aid. They show that aid 
from donors to ideologically close recipients might fuel political business cycles by increasing 
aid transfers prior to an election. Aid thus allows incumbent governments to distort the economy, 
                                                 
15
 On the other hand, favoritism in terms of relaxing conditions which could have enhanced the growth effects of aid 
could prevail in looser aid relationships where donors use aid as a temporary bargaining chip to gain political or 
economic support from ideologically distant recipient countries, compared to more permanent aid relationships with 
ideologically closer recipients. Note that this argument resembles the above-noted ‘political movement’ hypothesis 
of Thacker (1999), rather than the ‘political proximity’ hypothesis. 
16
 The previous literature shows that this might indeed be the case. For example, Bermeo (2010) finds that donors 
give more aid to countries with which they have strong existing ties. 
17
 Note that we account for this possibility by including aid squared in our estimations. 
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which might reduce growth rates in the medium and longer run (after the immediate stimulating 
effect of expansionary electoral policies evaporates). 
Finally, donor inertia and the persistence of multi-year funding and allocation decisions 
work against finding significant effects of ideological proximity on the growth impact of foreign 
aid. Inertia and limited flexibility to adjust aid commitments for projects extending over several 
years weaken the link between ideological donor-recipient alignment and aid allocation. In 
particular, donor reactions to changes in the ideological orientation of the government in recipient 
countries, e.g., after elections, would be attenuated and delayed. On a more positive note, the 
moderating effect of multi-year funding and allocation decisions implies that we would err on the 
‘conservative’ side; significant results on the growth impact of ideological proximity within 
donor-recipient pairs are unlikely to be biased upwards. 
 
1.3. Data and method 
A substantial amount of literature investigates the question of whether and to what extent aid 
affects growth. Many of the contributors to this literature are divided into different camps, with 
groups of supporters finding that aid is effective and skeptics pointing to the lack of robustness of 
these results to the choice of control variables, samples, and methods of estimation (Roodman 
2007, Doucouliagos and Paldam 2009). Rather than propagating our own model, therefore, we 
closely follow the approach in Clemens et al. (2012) and add our variables of interest to some of 
their models. Clemens et al. show that the most prominent previous attempts to control for the 
potential endogeneity of aid rely on invalid instruments. Instead of suggesting more valid ones, 
Clemens et al. address the potential endogeneity of aid by differencing the regression equation 
and lagging aid so that it can reasonably be expected to cause growth rather than being its effect. 
We base our analysis on their permutations of Rajan and Subramanian (2008) – one of the studies 
that arguably gained most attention in the recent literature on aid and growth. We follow this 
prominent previous analysis, and add our measures for ideological proximity (and their 
interaction with aid) to its main equations.
18
 We rely on Clemens et al.’s specification following 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) to test robustness. 
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 A skeptical reader might argue that the setup of Clemens et al. (2012) suffers from endogeneity. For example, 
donors might grant more aid to a newly elected reform-oriented government. Higher growth resulting from these 
reforms could then spuriously be attributed to the increase in aid. On the other hand, donors might give more aid to 




In terms of timing, we focus on ideological alignment at the time the aid is disbursed. We 
assume that disbursed aid takes one five-year period to become effective, in either increasing or 
decreasing economic growth, following Clemens et al. (2012). As in Clemens et al. our reduced-
form empirical model is at the country-period level:  
 
ΔGrowthi,t = α+βΔAidi,t-1+γΔ(        
 )+δALIGNi,t-1+ζΔAidi,t-1*ALIGNi,t-1+ηΔXi,t+εi,t  (1) 
 
where Growthi,t is recipient country i’s average yearly growth of GDP per capita over period t. 
We denote the amount of aid (in percent of GDP) disbursed in the previous period as Aidi,t-1. 
           is defined as recipient i’s ideological proximity to the average donor, with amounts of 
aid received from a donor forming this donor’s weight. Specifically, we calculate it as:  
 
                              
 
    (2) 
 
where         is the aid share of donor   in recipient country  ’s total bilateral aid from the n 
members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in period    ; and         is 
ideological proximity of recipient country   and donor   at the time the aid is disbursed, measured 
as the absolute distance in political ideology between the recipient and the donor.
19
 We assign 
right-wing governments the value of one, center governments the value of two, and left-wing 
governments the value of three, based on the classification of Beck et al. (2001). Beck et al. code 
                                                                                                                                                              
aid is biased, we have no reason to expect a systematic bias for our variable of interest, the interaction of aid with 
ideological alignment for any given level of aid. As shown in Nizalova and Murtazashvili (2012: 2), “If all the 
regressors but the exogenous regressor and the interaction term between this exogenous regressor and an endogenous 
covariate are jointly independent of the exogenous regressor of interest, the OLS estimate of interaction term’s 
coefficient is consistent.” In the words of Nunn and Qian (2012), “interacting an arguably exogenous term 
[ideological distance between donors and recipients] with one that is potentially endogenous [foreign aid], can be 
interpreted as exogenous since we directly control for the main effect of the endogenous variable.” The intuition 
follows that of a difference-in-difference estimation strategy. While aid can clearly be endogenous to growth, we 
argue that a differential effect of aid on growth in aligned and non-aligned recipient countries is unlikely to arise via 
channels other than aid. Below we control for foreign direct investment and trade (and also interact them with our 
alignment indicator), which are the most obvious channels that could threaten this identification strategy.  
19
 Our approach of weighting with aid shares is similar to Spilimbergo’s (2009) analysis of the role of individuals 
educated in democracies for democracy in their home country, where he weights the host country’s level of 
democracy with the sending country’s number of students there. 
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political party orientation with respect to economic policies in these three categories.
20
 They 
assign a fourth category, “not applicable,” when a party has no ideology with respect to economic 
policy.
21
 We assign these non-partisan governments the value of 2, together with centrist 
governments. This is reasonable as governments in this category fall in between left-wing and 
right-wing ideologies (see also Aleman 2009).  
Note that the Beck et al. (2001) data are unlikely to measure ideology in a way that makes 
governments’ ideological positions perfectly comparable, in particular between countries that are 
substantially different, such as donors and recipients of foreign aid. Clearly, a social democratic 
government might be more closely aligned with a Christian-democratic government than with a 
communist one. In our coding, the former would however be more closely aligned with the latter. 
While we would like to use perfect data for our analysis, such data do not exist for the wide range 
of countries and years included in our sample. This explains why Beck et al.’s ideology data are 
widely used in the political science and economics literature (e.g., Dutt and Mitra 2005, 2006, 
Mukherjee et al. 2009, Ha 2012).
22
 Beck et al. compared their data with those in Huber and 
Inglehart (1995) and found the codings to be the same in the vast majority (see Keefer 2012). 
When we compare these data with Swank’s (2009) Comparative Parties Data Set as well as with 
the Comparative Political Data Set from Armingeon et al. (2011), we find them to be 
significantly correlated at the one percent level.
23
 Most importantly, measurement error arising 
from blurred classifications of governments’ ideology would render it less likely that we find 
significantly positive effects of ideological proximity on aid effectiveness. In other words, we err 
on the ‘conservative’ side given that wrong classifications (unless systematically biased) would 
work against us finding significant effects.  
                                                 
20
 According to Keefer (2012), right-wing parties are defined as “conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing,” 
left-wing parties are “communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing” and center refers to parties that are 
“centrist or when party position can best be described as centrist (e.g. party advocates strengthening private 
enterprise in a social-liberal context).”  
21
 Specifically, “not applicable” is assigned when the party does not focus on economics, or there are competing 
ideological wings, or information about the party’s program is not available. In almost half of these observations, the 
chief executive is either independent, the monarch, from the military, or parties do not exist at all. In our sample, this 
coding is applied to 116 countries in at least one period (36 percent of all observations). 
22
 Some studies also use governments’ ideology in a dyadic setting, as we do (e.g., Allee and Peinhardt 2010, Dreher 
and Jensen 2013, Carter and Stone 2014). 
23
 Specifically, we rely on the indicator “Left party legislative seats as a percent of all legislative seats” from 
Swank’s data and on Armingeon et al.’s indicator “Right-wing parties in percentage of total cabinet posts, weighted 
by days.” We do not use these data in our regressions due to the limited samples they cover. 
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Note also that our specification assumes that ideology can be treated as cardinal. 
Following Dutt and Mitra (2005), we tested this assumption using separate indicator variables for 
the three groups of ideology: 
 
ΔGrowthi,t = α+βΔAidi,t-1+δ1LEFTi,t-1+ζ1ΔAidi,t-1*LEFTi,t-1+δ2CENTERi,t-1+ζ2ΔAidi,t-1* CENTERi,t-1 
+εi,t  (3) 
 
We test whether δ1=2δ2 and ζ1=2ζ2 holds simultaneously. At conventional levels of significance, 
we cannot reject this joint hypothesis, so that “there are efficiency gains from treating ideology as 
a cardinal measure, with equal distances between right and center and between center and left” 
(Dutt and Mitra 2005: 63). We therefore treat ideology as cardinal in all regressions below. 
We calculate (mis-)alignment as the absolute difference between the value of ideology for 
the donor government and the value for the recipient government. The resulting measure thus 
ranges from zero when the donor and recipient governments are ideologically aligned to two 
indicating the maximum possible value of ideological misalignment. Multiplying bilateral 
differences with a donor’s aid share results in the overall measure of aid-weighted ideological 
proximity for each year, which is then averaged over the respective period of time. All 
regressions include the control variables used in the original study, denoted X, which we include 
contemporaneously.
24
 In some specifications we include aid squared to test for decreasing returns 
to aid, again following Clemens et al. (2012). Finally, ε is an error term.  
According to Clemens et al. (2012), the appropriate method to test for the effect of aid on 
economic growth has to account for the non-linear effect of aid, has to remove country fixed-
effects through first-differencing,
25
 and has to lag aid by one period. As they argue, this 
specification minimizes potential misspecification due to reversed causality between aid and 
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 Following Rajan and Subramanian (2008), our regressions include: (log) initial GDP/capita, initial (Wacziarg and 
Welch’s extension of Sachs and Warner’s) trade policy index, (log) initial life expectancy, (log) inflation, initial 
M2/GDP, budget Balance/GDP, revolutions, and period dummies. The original study also includes time-invariant 
variables that are removed here (as in Clemens et al. 2012) through taking differences. Table A1 in the Appendix A 
reports the sources and definitions of all variables, while we show descriptive statistics in Table A2. 
25
 Alternatively, one might want to estimate the regression in levels and control for country-fixed effects. When the 
variable of interest is an interacted variable, standard fixed effects estimation can imply spurious results when the 
coefficients of the interacted variables are heterogeneous across countries (Ozer-Balli and Sørensen 2013). In our 
case, the effect of aid on growth might well differ across recipient countries. When we estimate the regression with 
country-fixed effects we therefore demean the interacted variables within each country before interacting them. Our 
main results are unaffected, as can be seen in Appendix A, Table A3. We thank an anonymous reviewer for alerting 
us of this possibility. 
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growth, and omitted variables bias. This is our preferred estimation strategy. We report the results 
in the next section. 
1.4. Results 
Table 1.1 shows the results for the Rajan and Subramanian (RS) regressions using the extended 
data of Clemens et al. (2012), which we updated to cover the 1975-2010 period.
26
 All data are 
averaged over five years. The dependent variable is the (change in the) average annual growth 
rate of real GDP per capita; we measure aid as (the change in) gross bilateral Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) as a percentage of GDP.
27
 We control for multilateral aid for 
which we cannot calculate ideological alignment but which might be used to substitute for 
ideologically motivated changes in bilateral aid and might thus bias our results if omitted. We 
also include repayments of bilateral and multilateral aid.
28
 However, none of them turns out to be 
robustly significant in our estimates below. 
Column 1 of Table 1.1 does not include our ideological alignment measure. As can be 
seen, average bilateral aid increases economic growth at the ten percent level of significance.
 
In 
column 2 we include the aid-weighted ideological alignment (ALIGN) and column 3 adds its 
interaction with aid. The results show an insignificant coefficient for ideological alignment itself, 
but a significant and negative interaction, at the one percent level. We are interested in the 
marginal effect of aid, which depends on the value of ideological alignment. In terms of the 
notation in equation (1), the marginal effect of ΔAid amounts to β + ζALIGNi,t-1. We calculate it 
over the range of ideological distance in our sample, from zero to two, and show the result in 
Figure 1.1, together with the 90 percent confidence interval. 
As is obvious from the negative coefficient of the interaction term (ζ), Figure 1.1 shows 
the marginal effect of changes in aid to decrease with ideological distance. Calculated at average 
distance (which is 0.94), the marginal effect implies that an increase in aid by one percentage 
point increases growth by 0.24 percentage points, at the ten percent level of significance. At the 
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 The sample is limited by the availability of political ideology in Beck et al. (2001), which is not available prior to 
1975. 
27
 Clemens et al. (2012) calculated the data for GDP per capita growth based on the Penn World Table up to 2004 
and the World Development Indicators for the year 2005, as described in the technical appendix to Clemens et al. 
(2012). We updated GDP per capita growth until 2010 based on the Penn World Table 7.1. 
28
 While we think it is superior to allow for separate coefficients on gross aid and repayments, we tested the 
robustness of our results to using net ODA (and omitting repayments) instead. As can be seen in Appendix A, Table 
A4, our results are not affected by this. 
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lowest ideological distance of zero, a one percentage point increase of bilateral aid increases GDP 
per capita growth by 0.85 percentage points (which is statistically significant at the one percent 
level). By contrast, at the highest ideological distance of two, one percentage point increase in 
bilateral aid decreases GDP per capita growth by 0.44 percentage points, statistically significant 




Figure 1.1 Marginal effect of Δaid on Δgrowth as political alignment changes 
 
To put these results in perspective, consider the marginal effects of the control variables. 
The statistically significant variables include (log) initial GDP per capita, (log) inflation, and 
revolutions. According to column 3, the coefficient on initial GDP per capita implies that growth 
decreases by 0.74 percentage points when initial GDP per capita increases by ten percent. Our 
model also shows that each additional revolution decreases GDP per capita growth by 0.77 
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0.12 percentage points. Overall, the effect of ideological distance on the marginal effect of aid on 
growth is clearly not negligible, compared to the other variables in the model.
29
 
In column 4 we add squared terms for the aid variables and column 5 adds the interaction 
of bilateral aid squared with ALIGN. The results show that aid squared and its interaction with 
ALIGN are not significant at conventional levels. Decreasing returns to aid do not seem to play a 




In Table 1.2 we replace total bilateral aid, aid-weighted ideological distance, and their 
interaction by two separate aid variables indicating the amount of aid received from aligned and 
non-aligned donors, respectively. Specifically, bilateral aid from aligned donors is the sum of aid 
disbursements to GDP in each year from donors with zero ideological distance to the particular 
recipient, averaged over the respective period of time. Bilateral aid from non-aligned donors is 
calculated in analogy for aid relationships in which the donor is left-wing and the recipient is 
right-wing, or vice versa. In other words, we contrast aid relations of donors and recipients at 
opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, omitting aid relations with an ideological distance of 
“one,” i.e., where either the donor or the recipient is in the political center. We however also 
show regressions including such aid, and regressions including aid relations involving either a 
recipient or a donor in the center.
31
 
Table 1.2 shows that aid in misaligned relationships hurts growth, while aid in 
ideologically aligned relationships does not affect growth at conventional levels of significance 
(column 1). When we include two separate squared terms for the two types of aid (in column 2), 
there do not seem to be decreasing (or increasing) returns to scale from aid donated by 
ideologically aligned donors. At the same time, the squared term is statistically significant at the 
                                                 
29
 One might argue that the effect of non-alignment could be driven by recipient country ideology alone, rather than 
by differences between the ideology of donors and recipients. As stressed by an anonymous reviewer, our aid-
weighted alignment variable is correlated with the ideology of recipients unless their aid inflows are balanced 
between donors of different ideology. However, the correlation proves to be modest, with a coefficient of 0.289. All 
the same, we included the recipient’s ideology and its interaction with aid to the regression, so that variation in 
alignment reflects donor rather than recipient ideology. While the effectiveness of aid does depend on recipient 
ideology, the interaction between aid and political alignment is hardly affected by the inclusion of these additional 
variables (see Appendix A, Table A5). We also replicated the regression including aid from left donors, center 
donors and right donors separately, controlling for recipient ideology. As can be seen in Table A5, the coefficients 
and significances of these different types of aid differ to some extent. We reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients 
across the three types of aid at the one percent level of significance.  
30
 Interestingly, the effect of multilateral aid repayments turns out to be significant in this specification. We find that 
multilateral aid repayments reduce growth when being low, but increase growth when being high. 
31
 We do not report the results for the control variables in the table to reduce clutter. 
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five percent level for aid from donors of opposite ideology. Misaligned aid decreases growth 
once it exceeds 1.25 percent of GDP.  
Columns 3 and 4 include an additional aid variable capturing “less mis-aligned” (or “less 
aligned”) aid relationships, where either the donor or the recipient has a center government (but 
not both). As in the analysis above, we include “other” types of governments in the center 
category. However, we control for this category (“Aid undefined distance”).
32
 When squared 
terms are excluded (column 3), it seems that aid from less aligned donors increases growth, while 
aid from aligned and non-aligned donors has no significant effect. However, column 4 shows that 
the effect is again non-linear, with aid from non-aligned donors reducing the effectiveness of aid 
if given in abundance (the turning point being aid in the order of 4.6 percent of GDP), but aid 
from less aligned and aligned donors increasing growth. 
As a next step, it is interesting to see whether all types of differences in the ideological 
orientation between the donor and recipient change the effectiveness of aid in the same way. 
Recall that we hypothesized incentive problems to loom particularly large when the donor is 
altruistic and poverty-averse, while the recipient government cares more for the welfare of the 
ruling elite and exploits the altruism of donors. This would imply that misalignment between a 
left-wing donor and a right-wing recipient would be more harmful for the effectiveness of aid 
than misalignment between a right-wing donor and a left-wing recipient.  
We test this hypothesis in column 5 of Table 1.2. We introduce interactions between 
aligned and non-aligned donor-recipient pairs with variables measuring the share over a period 
that the recipient government was either left-wing or center (and right-wing recipients thus being 
the omitted category). As can be seen, aid in misaligned relationships is significantly negative 
when given by a right-wing donor to a center or left-wing recipient.
33
 The coefficient shows that 
the marginal effect of aid on growth is reduced by 0.70 (0.76) percentage points when the donor 
is right-wing and the recipient is left-wing (center), compared to when the donor is left-wing and 
the recipient right-wing. The evidence is clearly in conflict with the hypothesis derived from the 
models of Azam and Laffont (2003) and Torsvik (2005). One may suspect that right-wing donor 
governments are more likely to use aid as a means of buying political support – not necessarily 
from traditional allies but also from left-wing recipient governments. Another possible 
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 When we exclude this variable results are qualitatively similar. 
33
 When we include the squares of aligned and non-aligned aid these results are unchanged. 
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explanation could be that right-wing donor governments are particularly intrusive in conditioning 
aid in their relations with left-wing recipients, thereby increasing transaction costs. 
We next turn to potential explanations for the reduced effect of aid in non-aligned donor-
recipient pairs. Recall that our theory attributes this effect to the lack of trust, higher transaction 
costs, and the composition of aid. While we lack the data to test for the role of trust and 
transaction costs, we can test the importance of the composition of aid. Given the availability of 
data on different modalities of aid delivery and the type of aid across recipient countries, it is 
possible to examine whether and to what extent the composition of aid differs between aligned 
and non-aligned donor-recipient pairs. While a detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this 
paper, Table A6 in Appendix A reports the share in a recipient’s total aid that is tied, partially 
tied and untied according to alignment status as well as the shares of budget and project aid 
received. We find that ideologically aligned countries receive a lower share of their aid as tied 
aid, but a higher share as untied aid, significant at the one percent level, while there is no 
significant difference with respect to partially tied aid. This fits our theory well. To the contrary, 
aligned countries receive a lower share of their aid as budget aid, while the share in project aid 
does not differ significantly between aligned and non-aligned country pairs. There are no 
significant differences between the shares of aid in the social and private sector for aligned 
donor-recipient pairs on the right and left. Clearly, these bivariate correlations (and the levels of 
significances between them) could easily be driven by omitted variables. We leave a more 
detailed analysis of this question for future research.  
Finally, we test to what extent the composition of aid is responsible for the effect of 
ideological distance on aid effectiveness. In Table A7 in the Appendix A we include the shares of 
tied and untied aid in our main regression (of column 3 in Table 1.1), with partially tied aid being 
the omitted category. These regressions therefore hold the influence of the composition of aid 
constant. If the effect of ideological distance on the effectiveness of aid we found above arises 
exclusively from changes in the composition of aid, the interaction between changes in the 
overall amount of aid and ALIGN should no longer be significant once we hold changes in the 
composition constant. To the extent that aid composition is no relevant transmission channel for 
our result, we expect the above finding to be unchanged. 
Table A7 includes the same control variables as the main regressions above (column 3 of 
Table 1.1) but does not show them. The results are almost identical to those excluding the shares 
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We tested the robustness of our results in a number of ways, as detailed in Appendix A. 
We replicate the analysis using Clemens et al.’s (2012) permutations of Burnside and Dollar 
(2000). We use net rather than gross disbursements as dependent variable, control for non-DAC 
aid, humanitarian aid, inflowing refugees, and civil wars, include an interaction of multilateral aid 
with alignment, and include ALIGN in changes rather than levels. Ideological alignment could be 
correlated with trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) patterns that affect the impact of 
alignment on the effectiveness of aid on growth. We therefore control for trade and FDI as a 
share of GDP. We also construct alignment measures using bilateral trade and FDI as weights, in 
analogy to how we calculated aid-weighted alignment, and include them in our regression. 
Governments in certain world regions might be more likely to receive aid from donors of 
particular ideology and the aid they receive might differ in effectiveness for reasons other than 
ideology. We therefore interact aid with dummies for five regions (East Asia and Pacific, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa). 
Our results are robust to all these changes. Our results are weaker when we focus on early-impact 
aid instead of total aid. Arguably, the larger noise due to missing information on sectoral aid 
commitments and disbursements can explain these differences. We split the sample in a number 
of ways (along the lines of democracy, corruption, good policy, and the Cold War period) but do 
not find significant differences between these samples. 
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 We also tried to control for budget aid and project aid. However, the number of non-zero observations was too low 
to run these regressions. When we include the shares of social and private sector aid, the results are unchanged. 
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Table 1.1 Political alignment and growth, 1975-2010, OLS 
 
Dependant variable: ΔGrowth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Aid/GDP            0.256*         0.267**        0.848***       0.780***       1.042***
                 [0.138]        [0.135]        [0.199]        [0.214]        [0.345]   
Alignment -0.542 -0.601 -0.548 -0.470
                 [0.565]        [0.526]        [0.533]        [0.550]   
Aid*Alignment       -0.645***      -0.623***       -0.928** 
                 [0.181]        [0.199]        [0.390]   
Multilateral aid -0.112 -0.114 -0.050 0.018 0.063
                 [0.133]        [0.132]        [0.123]        [0.265]        [0.277]   
Bilateral repayments       -0.637**       -0.621*  -0.457 -1.018 -0.963
                 [0.318]        [0.319]        [0.297]        [0.843]        [0.844]   
Multilateral repayments -0.737 -0.820 -0.273       -3.262*        -3.400*  
                 [0.752]        [0.810]        [0.695]        [1.768]        [1.776]   
Aid squared 0.002 -0.008
                 [0.007]        [0.015]   
Bilateral repayments squared 0.172 0.149
                 [0.206]        [0.206]   
Multilateral repayments squared        1.316**        1.333** 
                 [0.649]        [0.651]   
Multilateral aid squared -0.001 -0.005
                 [0.014]        [0.015]   
Aid squared*Alignment 0.012
                 [0.015]   
Initial GDP p.c. (log)       -8.138***      -7.830***      -7.729***      -7.808***      -7.832***
                 [1.242]        [1.217]        [1.215]        [1.207]        [1.205]   
Initial life expectancy (log) -0.050 -0.025 -0.035 -0.041 -0.043
                 [0.074]        [0.069]        [0.064]        [0.062]        [0.062]   
Openness           0.899** 0.500 0.429 0.400 0.400
                 [0.428]        [0.481]        [0.473]        [0.483]        [0.484]   
Inflation (log)       -1.154***      -1.266***      -1.292***       -1.270**       -1.257** 
                 [0.385]        [0.484]        [0.491]        [0.493]        [0.498]   
Initial M2/GDP        0.024*  -0.017 -0.017 -0.022 -0.023
                 [0.014]        [0.021]        [0.021]        [0.021]        [0.021]   
Budget Balance/GDP 0.109 0.087 0.106 0.087 0.089
                 [0.120]        [0.117]        [0.118]        [0.124]        [0.126]   
Revolutions       -0.614*        -0.683**       -0.769**       -0.776**       -0.793** 
                 [0.352]        [0.330]        [0.326]        [0.327]        [0.328]   
Constant    0.344        2.662*         2.903**        3.069**        3.017** 
                 [0.272]        [1.376]        [1.351]        [1.321]        [1.340]   
Adj. R-Squared 0.258 0.315 0.339 0.336 0.335
Number of Countries 67 67 67 67 67
Number of Observations 299 299 299 299 299
OLS panel estimation in first differences: country fixed effects.  All regressions include period dummies. All aid 
variables and repayments are in percent of recipient country's GDP. Aid denotes gross bilateral aid. Aid variables 
and Alignment are lagged once. Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Dependant variable: Δgrowth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Aid aligned 0.112 -0.185 0.33 -0.076 0.071
                 [0.184]        [0.241]        [0.236]        [0.331]        [0.246]   
Aid not aligned (left vs. right)       -0.247** 0.098 -0.018 0.369 0.291
                 [0.115]        [0.206]        [0.182]        [0.305]        [0.294]   
Aid less aligned (center vs. left or right)        0.486** 0.183
     [0.198]        [0.274]   
Aid undefined distance -0.215 0.007
     [0.157]        [0.238]   
Aid squared aligned 0.033        0.051*  
                 [0.023]        [0.027]   
Aid squared not aligned       -0.033**       -0.040** 
                 [0.016]        [0.018]   
Aid squared less aligned        0.019*  
     [0.010]   
Aid squared undefined distance -0.015
     [0.010]   
Aid aligned*Left -0.077
                 [0.350]   
Aid not aligned*Left       -0.746** 
                 [0.332]   
Aid aligned*Center 0.243
                 [0.422]   
Aid not aligned*Center       -0.836** 
                 [0.416]   
Left        -0.138
                 [0.432]   
Center      -0.468
                 [0.459]   
Adj. R-Squared 0.307 0.315 0.326 0.334 0.313
Number of Countries 67 67 67 67 67
Number of Observations 299 299 299 299 299
OLS panel estimation in first differences: country fixed effects.  All regressions include period dummies. All aid variables 
are in percent of recipient country's GDP. Aid denotes gross bilateral aid. Aid and Alignment variablea are lagged once. 




Previous studies on the economic growth effects of foreign aid focused on factors such as the 
quality of governance, institutions and economic policies in recipient countries to explain 
differences in the effectiveness of aid. By contrast, the political ideology of governments and the 
ideological proximity between donors and recipients along the left-right spectrum have received 
scant attention. Theoretically, we argue that ideological proximity improves the effectiveness of 
aid by generating trust and reducing transaction costs. 
We test this hypothesis empirically by considering the political ideology of donor and 
recipient governments along the left-right spectrum. We account for ideological proximity by 
augmenting the prominent aid-growth study of Rajan and Subramanian (2008), interacting the aid 
variable with our indicators of ideological proximity. We follow the approach of Clemens et al. 
(2012) and mitigate potential endogeneity problems by estimating the augmented models in first 
differences. Our identification strategy follows the intuition of a difference-in-difference 
approach, where we argue that a differential effect of aid on growth in aligned and non-aligned 
recipient countries is unlikely to arise via channels other than aid (even if the level of aid itself 
would be endogenous to growth). 
We find that aid tends to be less effective when political ideology differs between the 
donor and the recipient. The interaction between aid and ideological distance is significantly 
negative. At the lowest ideological distance, a one percentage point increase of bilateral aid 
increases GDP per capita growth by 0.79 percentage points, while it decreases growth by 0.64 
percentage points at the highest level of ideological distance. Furthermore, the negative effect of 
ideological distance between the governments of donor and recipient countries on the 
effectiveness of aid is corroborated when replacing the interaction terms by separate aid 
variables, indicating the amount of aid received by ideologically aligned and non-aligned donors, 
respectively. In contrast to aid from ideologically closer donors, aid from misaligned donors 
tends to be associated with significantly lower growth. We do not find evidence, however, that 
ideological misalignment is more harmful for growth if left-wing donors grant aid to right-wing 
recipients. 
Further research could help disentangle the specific transmission mechanisms in our 
theory underlying our major finding that ideological misalignment between donors and recipients 
impairs the effectiveness of aid. Detailed country studies may reveal distinct characteristics of 
ideologically misaligned aid relationships, including transaction cost-increasing and growth-
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impairing intrusiveness on the part of donors and/or evasion of conditionality and monitoring on 
the part of recipients. A related question that could be analyzed in greater detail in country studies 
is whether ideologically misaligned donor-recipient relations erode trust and give rise to higher 
transaction costs by being associated with mission creep, fine-tuned aid and donor-managed 
projects. 
In any case, our findings suggest that negative growth effects of aid were easier to avoid if donors 
focused on recipients with similar political ideology. This invites a new dimension of aid 
selectivity, in addition to targeting aid according to recipient need and merit. It also invites a new 
dimension of coordination among donors. It appears that it would be easier for donors to “respect 
partner country leadership,” as the Paris Declaration has put it, and to reduce transaction costs if 
donors specialized not only according to comparative advantages they might have in certain 
countries or sectors, but also left ideologically misaligned recipients to donors with a closer fit in 




2. Your development or mine? Effects of donor-recipient cultural 
differences on the aid-growth nexus 
 
 
Abstract: Development aid from the West may lead to adverse growth effects in the global South 
due to the neglected cultural differences between development aid (paradigm) providers and 
recipients. I test this hypothesis empirically by augmenting an aid-growth model with proxy 
variables for cultural differences between donors and recipients. First, I use donor-recipient 
genetic distance, i.e., blood types, to capture the traditional way of cultural transmission. Second, 
I use western education of recipient country leaders to capture resource-based transmission of 
culture. Results of the OLS panel estimation in first differences show that a one unit increase in 
donor-recipient genetic distance reduces the main effect of aid on growth by 0.2 percentage 
points when aid is increased by one percentage point. In turn, a one percentage point increase in 
aid yields on average a 0.3 percentage point increase in growth after a decade for countries with 
western educated leaders. 
 
JEL classification: O11; O19 
Keywords: aid effectiveness, cultural differences, genetic distance, western education  
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It is a well-known fact that the raw data on development aid and economic growth are 
uncorrelated. For the last 50 years many authors have tried to overcome this fact by putting 
structure on the data. They have reached all results possible; see Doucouliagos and Paldam 
(2011, 2009) 
 
for a comprehensive bibliography.
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  In particular, Doucouliagos and Paldam 
(2009) perform three meta-analyses for the unconditional, conditional and null strands of the aid 
effectiveness literature (AEL) and fail to find a statistically significant effect of aid on growth.
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They also note: “If there is an effect, it must be small” (2009, p. 457). This paper, therefore, 
explores one of the possible reasons for this negligible effect of aid on growth.  
Aid is an intervention of a developed country into the society of the recipient country. When 
the two countries have very different belief systems and cultures this gives different preferences. 
This will easily lead to a mismatch between supply and demand in development transactions 
(Easterly, 2006) and diminish aid’s effect on growth.
37
 This fact has been extensively 
documented through anecdotes (Bauer 1971, Escobar 1995, Easterly 2002, 2006, Moyo 2009, 
Altaf 2011, Coyne 2013), yet donor-recipient cultural differences have not been sufficiently 
addressed in the AEL. The literature rather focuses on recipient characteristics only when 
studying the aid-growth nexus. One exception is a study by Dreher et al. (2015a) that augments 
an aid-growth model with the donor-recipient differences in government ideology and its 
interaction with aid. They show that larger differences in donor-recipient political ideology 
reduce aid’s effect on growth. This paper is closely related to that of Dreher et al. (2015a). 
While the previous chapter explores the effect of donor-recipient differences in formal 
institutions (government ideology) on the aid-growth nexus, in this chapter, I examine that of the 
informal institutions (culture, beliefs and values). Hence, I argue that the theoretically expected 
positive effect of development aid on growth can be reduced or diminished due to the neglect of 
donor-recipient cultural differences in the development paradigms. Consequently, the 
contribution of this paper is the empirical test for the effect of donor-recipient cultural differences 
on the aid-growth nexus.  
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Doucouliagos and Paldam (2011) update the meta-analysis from their 2009 study and find that some types of aid, 
such as program or project aid can be more effective than others. 
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 See Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Dalgaard et al. (2004) for conditional, Hansen and Tarp (2001) for 
unconditional and Rajan and Subramanian (2008) for null effect of aid on growth.  
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I conceptualize my hypothesis by analyzing relevant literature on the cultural underpinnings 
in development paradigms in Section 2. Anecdotal evidence in Section 3 shows how cultural 
differences can affect the aid-growth nexus.  As described in Section 4, I use two proxy variables 
for cultural differences – genetic distance and western education of recipient country leaders – to 
measure their effect on the aid-growth nexus. Thereafter, following the technique in the previous 
chapter, I construct an aid-adjusted measure for the genetic distance between donors and 
recipients. I adopt the estimation method of Clemens et al. (2012) and augment an aid-growth 
model with proxy measures of donor-recipient cultural differences and their interactions with aid 
(Section 5), as in the previous chapter. The estimation results reported in Section 6 show that the 
effectiveness of aid is significantly reduced when a greater genetic distance exists between a 
recipient and western donors. In addition, results show that recipients with western educated 
leaders benefit from aid in the long run. The robustness tests presented in Section 7 reveal that 
donor-recipient differences in language and ethnicity do not have a statistically significant effect 
on the aid-growth nexus, and the main findings of this paper do not suffer from the inclusion of 
additional (omitted) variables. Section 8 concludes and provides policy implications. 
2.2. Cultural underpinnings in development paradigms 
Early development strategies evolved from modernization theories and practices in the West 
during the 20
th
 century (Bauer 1971, Escobar 1995, Gilman 2003, Radcliffe and Laurie 2006). 
Modernization, per se, is the transition from a traditional society into a modern one. It is 
characterized, on one hand, by cultural change (Inglehart and Baker 2000) and, on the other, by 
democracy, the development of a welfare state, egalitarianism, universal public education, 
income taxation and land reform (Gilman 2003). Modernity is premised upon rational technology 
and scientific knowledge: “It is the model of the West detached in some way from its 
geographical origins and locus” (Gilman 2003: 1). 
Moreover, development discourses in the past century have been influenced by Talcott 
Parsons’ functional sociology theory (1951), according to which certain types of thinking and 
behavior can benefit the modernization process (Gilman 2003, Turner 1999). A distinct 
characteristic of modernization is the change in beliefs and values that took place during the 20
th
 
century in the West (Inglehart and Baker 2000). While changes in certain cultural beliefs and 
values accompanying modernization were internal to Western economies, in particular, to the 
United States (Rostow 1990) these were imposed externally on the diverse populations in the 
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global South via the development processes (Escobar 1995). As Turner (1999) notes, in the 1950s 
and 1960s, policymakers in donor countries were encouraged to advocate modern cultural traits 
in aid recipient countries following Parsonian theory. Changing the beliefs, attitudes and 
behaviors of local people was seen as a way of “dragging them away from ‘traditional’ practices 
and introducing them to the modern Western culture” (Schech and Haggis 2000 cited in Radcliffe 
and Laurie 2006:  233). Academics and practitioners provide extensive anecdotal evidence, 
showing that the differences in preferences between donor and recipient countries can be part of 
the reason why development aid fails to generate long-term economic growth in recipient 
countries (Bauer 1971, Escobar 1995, Easterly 2002, Easterly 2006, Moyo 2009, Altaf 2011, 
Coyne 2013).  
To illustrate, Moyo (2009) argues that foreign aid itself is largely responsible for Africa’s 
underdevelopment. After examining how several aid projects have hindered the grassroots 
development, she concludes that foreign aid is destructive for African economies as it distorts 
incentives, perpetuates corruption and supports dysfunctional political elites. In relation to the aid 
paradigm for promoting democracy in African countries, Moyo writes: “In the early stages of 
development it matters little to a starving African family whether they can vote or not. Later they 
may care, but first of all they need food for today, and tomorrows to come, and that requires an 
economy that is growing” (Moyo 2009: 44). 
Thus, applications of the conventional economic models of the West in the rest of the world 
can be largely responsible for development paradigm failures: in these models individual 
preferences are fixed in the assumptions of objective rationality. However, ‘objective’ rationality 
should not, and does not, always prevail when humans take actions in different times, places and 
contexts. Individuals may rather follow a subjective (bounded) rationality based on the existing 
options and alternatives available to them at a specific place and time (Kahneman 2003). Many 
prominent economic models for development arise from the rationality decisions available in 
Western societies but not necessarily in the rest. Therefore, development models that are taken to 
the aid recipient societies are rarely adjusted for such differences in culture. On that matter, Sen 
(2004) stresses the importance of studying how culture affects development in the presence of aid 
as it is highly influenced by the mainstream economists educated in the West.  
On the other hand, Hodler and Dreher (2012) argue that development paradigms are 
unsuccessful because they are mainly pursued by those countries that are doomed to failure in the 
first place. But, at the same time, these paradigms fail to match with the country-specific 
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circumstances. Clearly, differences in culture and belief systems can be part of the country-
specific circumstances. Culture is a type of local knowledge that is largely embedded in 
individuals, which makes it hard to measure (Gibson et al. 2005). How donor-recipient cultural 




2.3. Anecdotal evidence on cultural differences in development paradigms 
In the 1990s, Russia received thirteen structural adjustment loans to become a free-market 
economy after the collapse of the centrally-planned Soviet Union. The imposition of a market 
economy by donors onto the old Soviet enterprises was utopian: it was expected that, as in the 
West, the most competitive firms in Russia would drive out the inefficient ones based on the 
prices determined in the market. However, the opposite happened. Firms with influential 
managers were thriving with valuable inputs but worthless outputs. The networks and 
relationships with public officers and other firm managers outperformed supply and demand 
functions of the market and tax liabilities. The Soviet practice of doing business based on the 
informal rules, such as privileges and side-payments, carried on into the “imposed” market 
economy, and the efforts to transition failed. Such neglect of local practices of economic 
behavior in the western imposed structural adjustment programs was detrimental for the 
economic growth and progress in post-Soviet economies (Easterly 2006: 54). For example, 
Russia's economy recorded on average negative 5.7 percent growth rate from 1990-1999. During 
that decade, similar negative growth patterns were seen in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz 
Republic (Easterly 2006: 59). Meanwhile, Poland, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungry and 
Georgia experienced positive growth patterns.  
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Ford Foundation spent millions of dollars with the purpose of 
training Indians on Western legal education and spreading ideas of democracy and rule of law. 
However, the American-style schools did not translate well to India due to the caste divisions, 
patronage politics, low respect for law as a subject, absenteeism, and bribing. All of these 
realities where not appropriately addressed in Ford's grant. An American law professor from 
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 The descriptive statistics in Table B3 in Appendix B based on the data in this paper do not reveal much 
information on cultural proximity and how it can affect growth in different countries at different periods since there 
is no direct correlation between genetic distance and economic growth. In this case, only through the regression 




Harvard stated that the Indian population did not embrace the legal system promoted by Ford 
because the laws in the books are Western rather than of local origin (Easterly 2006: 271). After 
observing Ford's failure, an Indian law professor educated in the West proposed a new law school 
model that imitated the structure of the highly respected engineering and medical schools in 
India. Later, the Ford Foundation and other locals supported the initiative and today it has 
become the well-respected National Law School of India. This case highlights the importance of 
local knowledge in bringing about desired structural and social changes.  
In recent decades Ghana has continued to receive large amounts of foreign aid and the focus 
of the new paradigm has been good governance and the alleviation of poverty. Good governance 
also implies low levels of corruption in the country. However, foreign aid itself perpetuated 
corruption since the paradigm ignored how differently the practice of corruption is viewed in 
Ghana. Hasty (2005) specifies that corruption in Ghana is the use of public resources for social 
responsibility rather than for private gain as defined in the western lexicon. Premised upon 
power, privilege and responsibility, Ghanaian public officials have to satisfy so many social, 
cultural and material expectations of their extended family members and friends that it turns into 
an act of pleasure and intensifies the contacts. At the end of the day, the foreign aid money fails 
to serve its purpose and the economic growth in Ghana suffers from the increased levels of 
corruption, Ghana’s average economic growth rate per capita over 1996-2000 was 2 percent 
while bilateral aid composed about 8 percent of its GDP. Ghana’s corruption score in 
International Country Risk Guide decreased from 2.4 to 1.6 during the last decade.
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In the 2000s, the cultural changes implied by the well-intentioned development paradigms, 
such as women rights protection, secular education, mastery of state law over the customary law, 
have been controversial in Afghan society. The externally imposed social change created political 
opposition to the newly selected fragile government. The opponents argued that these policies 
were imported from the outside and aimed to destroy Afghan culture. Disconnections of Western 
experts from the realities of Afghanistan resulted in paradigm failure in reshaping the local 
economy (Coyne 2013:186). From 1996 to 2000, Afghanistan’s average growth rate per capita 
was negative 9 percent, while in the following period it was on average 5 percent.  
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 International Country Risk Guide measures corruption levels across countries and scales them from 1-6, where 
lower values indicate higher levels of corruption, see: ICRG (2012).  
43 
 
Altaf (2011) presents a detailed account of the failure of the Social Action Program (SAP) in 
1990s, which was developed by the government of Pakistan to fulfill the criteria of a donor 
organization without considering its appropriateness in the local setting. For instance, she 
describes a part of the program which carried out medical training for young women in rural 
areas. The project failed to be effective (women either emigrated for employment or were left 
unemployed) as it not only neglected gaps in the local healthcare system but also ignored certain 
circumstances related to local culture: adverse perceptions about women’s education and their 
employment in remote areas, superstitious thinking about vaccination and ‘irrational’ preferences 
for large families. Despite the expensive SAP funding, the average economic growth rate per 
capita fell from 1.9 percent in 1990-95 to 0.4 percent in 1996-2000. In addition, a number of 
social indicators also fail to improve. As Altaf (2011) points out, the failure of the SAP is not 
only a story of one program in one country but it is the story of the majority of aid programs in 
many developing countries.  
Anecdotal evidence can be motivating; however, it can also be non-representative and biased 
towards the extreme points of the distribution function. Therefore, it is important to test the 
reliability of the anecdotes and make use of the advantages of systematic statistical analysis. In 
the next section, I discuss existing measures for cultural differences and cultural transmission that 
can help in analyzing effects of cultural differences on the aid-growth nexus. 
2.4. Proxy variables for cultural differences and transmission 
Measuring cultural differences 
The concept of culture is defined differently depending on the type of literature and context. In 
the economic literature, culture is mainly defined as beliefs, values, preferences and norms, 
transmitted from one generation to another in a fairly unchanged manner (Bisin and Verdier 
2001, Guiso et al. 2009, Spolaore and Wacziarg 2009). Cavalli-Sforza (2001:175) defines it 
comprehensively as one’s “ability to learn from the experience of others, [which] is a special 
phenomenon that relies on communication. [It] enables us to accumulate prior discoveries and 
helps us profit from [the] experience transmitted by our ancestors-knowledge that we would not 
have on our own.” Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) show that values, attitudes, preferences and 




Hence, in this paper culture is understood as a set of beliefs about various aspects of life, 
which is shared by a group of people and is either communicated by parental teaching or learned 
from society at large.
40 
According to Inglehart and Welzel (2005) and the World Value Surveys, most of the aid-
recipient countries are characterized with traditional and survival values while western donors are 
characterized by secular-rational and self-expression values.
41
 The most important values in a 
traditional society are religion, patriotism, respect for authority, obedience, and marriage, among 
others. On the contrary, in secular-rational societies these are the least important values. In 
regards to the second dimension, societies characterized with survival values prefer security to 
liberty and exhibit intolerance of homosexuality, political passivism, distrust in outsiders and a 
low level of life satisfaction, among others. On the contrary, in societies with self-expression 
values the opposite is true. The findings of Inglehart and Welzel (2005) also suggest that values 
can change with modernization and, depending on the transition mode (agrarian to industrial and 
industrial to knowledge-society), different sets of values may change (traditional to secular 
rational and survival to self-expression).  
The cultural dimensions developed by Inglehart and Welzel (2005) are relevant to this study 
as they are closely associated with modernization and development processes. However, 
inconsistency of sample sizes throughout the waves of the World Value Surveys, especially for 
developing countries, as well as the endogeneity between cultural change and economic progress 
make them unsatisfactory for the identification strategy.
42
  
Cavalli-Sforza (2001) establishes a conceptual framework on the relationship between 
genome and culture where both accumulate information to be passed from one generation to 
another. It is important to highlight that genes do not affect culture because in contrast to 
genomes, one has a choice whether to accept the culture and beliefs received from another 
person. Cavalli-Sforza (2001) mentions two modes of cultural transmission: traditional – through 
observation, teaching and communication – or through resources developed by modern 
                                                 
40
Although the explanation for persistent belief systems is beyond the focus of this paper, research shows that it 
is most likely determined by the environmental, political and historical past of the society (Cosmides and Tooby 
1994, Inglehart and Baker 2000). 
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An exception is the US, which is characterized by self-expression and traditional values. 
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technology – books, computers and other media. Therefore, a measure of genetic distance can be 
a good proxy for cultural differences rather than an instrument as genes are not necessarily 
correlated with beliefs but rather have similar accumulation and transmission processes. 
Moreover, to stress the ethical appropriateness of this measure, Cavalli-Sforza (2001) explains 
that most of the variation in genes is between individuals and not ‘races’: genetic differences 
between observable physical characteristics of populations constitute a very small percentage of 
DNA and are mainly attributable to climate changes over long periods of time. 
In their model of the economics of cultural transmission and the dynamics of preferences, 
Bisin and Verdier (2001) show that globally stable heterogeneous preferences can exist among 
populations when children acquire beliefs, values and preferences from their parents (vertical) 
and/or adapt and imitate the beliefs, preferences and values most prevalent in a society 
(horizontal). That is, family and society are considered as substitutes in the socialization process. 
Bisin and Verdier's (2001) vertical cultural transmission can be related to the traditional way of 
cultural transmission, and their horizontal mode can be related to the resource-based cultural 
transmission discussed in Cavalli-Sforza (2001). In this study, I use both types of transmission 
channels as proxy variables for cultural differences. 
 
Proxy for Vertical Transmission of Culture 
 
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) develop an analytical framework linking genetic distance and 
income differences to explain long-term barriers to diffusion of development. Following Cavalli-
Sforza et al. (1994), Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) consider a type of genetic distance, also 
known as “co-ancestor coefficient,” which estimates the time passed since two populations 
shared common ancestors. More specifically, their measure of genetic distance represents the 
differences in the frequencies of blood types that prevail in different populations due to migration 
and isolation. This measure is based on neutral characteristics of genetic variations that resulted 
from the random drift rather than natural selection.
 43
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 A gene is commonly defined as a DNA sequence that codes for a protein (protein polymorphism). The data on 
allele frequencies for different genes in different populations of the world can be found at http://alfred.med.yale.edu/ 
For more details on the specifics of genetic distance see Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994), Cavalli-Sforza (2001) and 
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009). 
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Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) claim that this genetic distance measure captures 
intergenerationally transmitted characteristics that include beliefs, preferences, values and social 
norms (vertical transmission of culture). According to them, similarity in such characteristics 
eases the communication and adaptation of practices conducive to socio-economic development – 
such as rapid human capital accumulation, lower fertility and better political institutions. By 
extension, genetically distant populations face difficulties in interacting and communicating with 
one another that even language translation techniques cannot fully overcome, leading to 
resistance in adopting progressive practices (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2009: 513). In addition, 
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) point out that other proxy variables for cultural differences often 
used in the literature, such as religion, language and ethnicity, are also captured by the genetic 
distance because they are part of the intergenerationally transmitted characteristics.
44
 
Desmet et al. (2011) use the genetic distance from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) as a proxy 
for cultural differences within Europe as they find that genetically closer Europeans give similar 
answers to the World Value Surveys’ questions on perception of life, religion, family and morals. 
They show that the genetic distance is a preferred proxy for cultural differences by controlling for 
linguistic and geographic distances. In result, only the correlation between the genetic distance 
and cultural distance continues to be positive and statistically significant at the five percent level.  
Gorodnichenko and Roland (2010), on the other hand, instrument cultural differences with the 
genetic distance variable.  
Based on this literature, I use the genetic distance from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) 
between aid recipients and western donors as a proxy for cultural differences. I further compute 
an aid-adjusted genetic distance measure, a technique adopted from Dreher et al. (2015a). 
According to Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), genetic distance takes a value of zero in the case of 
identical allele distributions (frequency of blood types) across two populations, while it takes 
positive values where allele distributions differ. Large differences in allele distributions between 
two populations imply greater genetic distance between the two. 
Using data from Alesina et al. (2003) and Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994), Spolaore and Wacziarg 
(2009) compute a weighted genetic distance measure between countries, which accounts for 
recent immigration and populations that are composed of genetically distant subpopulations:  
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 These conclusions are linked with those of Bisin and Verdier (2000) who show that ethnic and religious minorities 
persist in the USA, in contrast to the “melting pot” theory, due to parental preferences for transmission of certain 
cultural traits to their offspring, such as strong preferences for marriages within same religion and ethnicity. 
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    ,                                                  (1) 
where     
  is the weighted genetic distance between country   and country  .     is the share of 
group   in country  ,     is the share of group   in country   and     is the genetic distance 
between groups   and  . Equation (1) represents expected genetic distance between two 
randomly selected individuals from two different countries.
45
  
In terms of development aid effectiveness, the weighted genetic distance (hereafter, genetic 
distance) between two populations may matter more or less depending on the magnitude 
(involvement and degree of intervention) of the aid received. To capture this influence, I compute 
an aid-adjusted genetic distance measure based on aid shares: 
 
                   
  
     ,                                                            (2) 
 
where        is donor  
   share of total bilateral aid in country  , in year  .     
  is the genetic 
distance between recipient   and donor   from equation (1).         is the aid-adjusted genetic 
distance to western donors for each recipient in period  . In line with the argument in the previous 
section, larger aid-adjusted genetic distance between a recipient and western donors indicates 
bigger differences in intergenerationally transmitted characteristics, including preferences, 
attitudes, values and beliefs.
46 
Vertical transmission of culture captures the traditional way of cultural adoption, which gives 
little weight to cross-cultural exposure and learning from alternative sources. Therefore, in this 
case, I expect aid's effect on growth to decrease as the genetic distance increases. In the next 
section, I present a proxy for horizontal cultural transmission to distinguish the effect of resource-
based cultural learning.  
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 Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) also construct another genetic distance measure based on the dominant population 
groups in every country, which is highly correlated with the weighted genetic distance (94 percent). It should be 
noted that the weighted genetic distance is the current match between populations that does not change for a donor-
recipient pair over the time period considered in this paper. 
46Appendix B includes maps for aid-adjusted genetic distance to western donors. 
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Proxy for Horizontal Transmission of Culture 
I use recipient country leaders’ education in the West to measure resource-based, horizontal, 
cultural transmission between aid recipients and western donors. Research shows that individuals 
who have studied in democratic states promote democracy in their home countries (Spilimbergo 
2009). Gift and Krcmaric (2015) argue that leaders educated in the West are more likely to push 
for democratization due to their democratic socialization in western societies. In addition, leaders 
educated for a prolonged period in (western) donor countries may promote the culture of the 
respective host country back home and foster international transactions (Constant and Tien 2010). 
That is, the leader's (individual's) socialization in the West may lead to the transmission of beliefs 
and values that are different from that of the parental transmission at home.  
I focus on the leaders and not on the share of individuals educated in the West because 
country leaders are responsible for internal and external policy at large, and development aid 
objectives need to be coordinated and negotiated with the recipient country’s leadership as noted 
in Paris Declaration. Also, Jones and Olken (2005) study country leaders' performance in terms 
of economic growth and monetary policy, and find that leaders play a significant role in the 
growth processes of their country, especially in authoritarian regimes. In addition, a study by 
Dreher et al. (2009) shows that the professional background and education of the head of the 
government, in the context of developing economies, matters for reforms.  
Following Gift and Krcmaric (2015), I code foreign education of a recipient country leader 
‘western’, if he or she studied either in the US or the UK. Also, the US and the UK have the 
lion’s share in total bilateral aid disbursements and a large share of recipient country leaders have 
been educated in these two donor countries. Moreover, development policies are largely 




2.5. Data and method 
In this paper, bilateral aid (hereafter, Aid) is defined as gross disbursements of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) from Development Assistance Committee (DAC) traditional 
(western) donors, a statistic taken from the OECD’s Aid Statistics database (2012).  
Economic growth data is from the Penn World Table. The data on the genetic distance is from 
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) and the data on leaders' foreign education and education level is 
from Dreher et al. (2013). The panel data includes 66 recipient countries from 1961 to 2010.
47
  
The aid-growth model of Rajan and Subramanian (2008), hereafter RS, is usually categorized 
as belonging to the “null strand” of AEL as no statistically significant effect of aid on growth is 
found. Like the original RS study, most of the aid-growth models in the AEL use instrumentation 
methods to tackle the endogeneity of aid. However, as Clemens et al. (2012) argue, based on 
Bazzi and Clemens (2013), the established results in the AEL suffer from the invalid 
instrumentation (mostly correlated with population) and weaknesses of GMM methodology (a 
“black-box”), which undermine their accuracy. Instead, Clemens et al. (2012) lag aid by one 
period to address the problem of reversed causality and use OLS estimator in first differences to 
capture country specific time-invariant omitted variables. I follow this strategy and distinguish 
the effect of donor-recipient cultural distance on the aid-growth nexus by augmenting the model 
of RS from Clemens et al. (2012) with the aid-adjusted genetic distance between recipients and 
donors and its interaction with aid. The reduced-form empirical model is as follows:  
 
                                                                ,       (3) 
 
where,       is (the change in) recipient country  ’s annual GDP per capita growth rate averaged 
over period   (five years),           denotes (the change in) total bilateral aid received  by 
country   in the period     as a percentage of its GDP,            is the lagged aid–adjusted 
measure of genetic distance as described in the previous section.        is (the change in) the 
vector of control variable from RS aid-growth model and       is the error term.  I am interested in 
the effect of  , the interaction between Aid and     , on growth. All variables are 5-year period 
averages as in RS. 
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 Detailed data sources and variable descriptions are provided in Appendix B, Table B3. 
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Similarly, in terms of horizontal cultural transmission, I augment RS aid-growth model from 
Clemens et al. (2012) with leaders' education in the West and its interaction with Aid. The 
reduced form of the empirical model is: 
 
                                                                 ,          (4)   
                                                    
where       indicates (the change in) a leader’s education in the West.  It is a continuous variable, 
since year dummies have been averaged over five year periods.        is an additional control 
variable for (the change in) leader’s education, ranging from illiterate to advanced (doctoral) 
degree.  The control variables (        are defined as in equation (3) and all variables are 5-year 
period averages. 
In equation (3) and (4), in addition to the RS control variables, I also include the changes in 
multilateral aid as well as bilateral and multilateral repayments as there is no reason to assume 
that these variables do not affect growth (Clemens et al. 2012). In the next section, I discuss 
possible endogenity issues in the models and the methodology specified above. 
Endogeneity concerns  
Genetic distance between donors and recipients is generally considered exogenous to growth 
as it is independent of natural selection and physical fitness of individuals (Spolaore and 
Wacziarg 2009). As Gorodnichenko and Roland (2010: 3) point out “there are no identified 
genetic reasons as to why some countries became wealthier than others.” However, the cultural 
transmission channel of the genetic distance variable might not be straightforward. One can argue 
that genetic distance measures differences in language or ethnicity instead. In the Appendix B, I 
present tests for these alternative measures. The results show that the donor-recipient distance in 
ethnic, linguistic and ethno-linguistic fractionalization do not affect aid's impact on growth and 
the effect of the key coefficient is hardly changed by this. 
Although Clemens et al. (2012) claim that their estimation methodology takes care of the 
endogeneity of aid, the concern may still persist. Yet, the coefficient of interest in this paper, the 
interaction term between Aid and     , is consistent given that one of the interaction terms is 
exogenous, as shown in Nunn and Qian (2012). Namely, the interaction between an exogenous 
term (i.e.,     ) and a potentially endogenous term (Aid) can be interpreted as exogenous as 
51 
 
long as the main effect of the endogenous variable is directly controlled for in the estimation.
48
 
Based on this, I argue that the differential effect of Aid on growth in culturally closer and distant 
recipients is most likely caused by Aid rather than other channels. Yet, when the aid shares are 
used as weights in the aid-adjusted genetic distance, this measure might not be fully exogenous 
after all.
49
 Therefore, in the robustness tests, I do not use the aid shares but instead take the 
average genetic distance between recipients and donors.
50
 The effect of the key coefficient is 
hardly affected by this change.  
In terms of leaders’ education abroad it may be the case that those individuals who choose 
western education already embrace the set of beliefs and preferences of the destination country. 
This would indicate a self-selection problem and introduce endogeneity. Interestingly, there is an 
empirical evidence showing that US educated leaders do not necessarily vote in-line with the US 
on key issues during United Nations General Assembly voting (Dreher et al. 2013). Additionally, 
reports show that future leaders choose to study abroad because it is prestigious to do so and not 
because of their unconditional acceptance of (liberal) Western culture and beliefs. For instance, 
autocrats in China, Russia and Africa have themselves studied in prestigious western universities 
or sent their children to the West without necessarily approving of western values (Braw 2014, 
Higgins and Fan 2012, Tschudi 2013). That is, the choice of western education does not 
essentially mean a preference for the western belief system over that of one’s own country. 
Rather, the exposure to the western lifestyle can help one to improve cross-cultural 
communication skills and possibly update the set of beliefs and values that one holds. 
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 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
50




Effects of Vertical Transmission of Culture 
Table 2.1 displays the OLS estimation in first differences for a panel of 66 recipients over 1961-
2000, averaged over 5-year periods, as in equation (3): Aid is also lagged once while aid-adjusted 
genetic distance is lagged once but not differenced.
51
  
Column (1) displays the baseline growth regression without inclusion of the      and Aid.  
     is added to the baseline in column (2). The      is statistically significant at the one 
percent level and has a negative sign. Based on the study of Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), the 
main effect of the      can be interpreted as cultural barriers to the knowledge diffusion from 
donor countries. The larger the genetic distance to the western donors the greater the cultural 
barriers to knowledge transfer.  
Aid is added to the baseline in column (3): its coefficient is positive but does not have a 
statistically insignificant effect on growth. This result is in line with RS original findings as well 
as with that of Clemens et al. (2012) when ‘long-impact’ aid is considered. The next column 
includes both the      and Aid, which increases the adjusted R2 by 0.01 points compared to the 
baseline. 
In column (5), Table 2.1, I include the variable of interest: the interaction between Aid and the 
    . This increases the adjusted R2 further, and almost 30 percent of the variation in growth is 
explained by the model. The coefficient for the main effect of Aid is positive and statistically 
significant at the five percent level. However, its overall effect on growth is reduced by the 
coefficient of interest, the interaction term, which is negative and statistically significant at the 
five percent level. In column (6), I add additional controls, such as bilateral and multilateral 
repayments and multilateral aid, none of which have statistically significant effects on growth.  In 
column (7), I include the squared terms of aid variables to capture any non-linear relationship 
between aid and growth. However, I do not find such a relationship, except in the case of 
multilateral repayments. Also, the adjusted R
2 
does not gain from the inclusion of the additional 
aid variables.  
Overall, the results in columns (5) and (6) show that a one unit increase in      reduces the 
effect of Aid on growth by 0.2 percentage points. Values of      range from 0.06 to 2.2, a one 
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unit increase in donor-recipient genetic distance would mean switching between Uruguay (0.2) 
and India (1.2).
52
 Thus, depending on the regression, the overall affect of Aid on growth ranges 
from 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points on average instead of a possible 0.3 to 0.4 percentage points, 
ceteris paribus.  
The marginal effects of the estimation results in column (5) are depicted in Figure 2.1, which 
shows that the overall effect of Aid remains positive to some extent, but once a country’s      
is larger than 1.5, the overall effect of bilateral aid gradually becomes negative. Countries with a 
very large genetic distance to the western donors include Tanzania and Botswana among 18 other 
countries, mostly from sub-Saharan Africa. In the sample Poland has the smallest, 0.06, while 
The Republic of Congo has the largest     , 2.2, to western donors. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Marginal effects of aid on growth as AwGD changes 
 
The results in Table 2.1 suggest that aid effectiveness is significantly reduced with larger 
genetic distance between the recipient and western donors. This also conforms with the notion 
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Aid-adjusted genetic distance (AwGD)
Figure 1. Average marginal effects of Aid (95% Confidence Interval)
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that culturally (genetically) closer populations find it easier to communicate and understand each 
other, which leads to a faster adoption of growth-generating development practices.  
Effects of Horizontal Transmission of Culture 
 
In Table 2.2, I estimate equation (4) with OLS in first differences as in Table 2.1. The 
coefficient of interest is that of the interaction between Aid and the leader’s western education. In 
this specification, the coefficient of Aid has mostly very weak or no statistically significant effect 
on growth while the interaction term is negative and statistically significant from columns (3) to 
(5).  
The results in Table 2.2 imply that on average a recipient country leader with western 
education has an adverse influence on the aid-growth nexus contemporaneously. However, the 
sign of the coefficient turns positive when education is lagged twice as shown in Table 2.3.  In 
column (4), Table 2.1, I add another control variable for leaders’ education abroad in general. 
This helps to single out the effect of western education from that of overall education abroad. The 
coefficient of the main variable of interest is hardly affected by this change. The results also show 
that, in general, education abroad has a positive effect on the aid-growth nexus.
53
 In column (5), I 
include squared terms of the aid and repayment variables, which increase the magnitude of the 
coefficient of the variable of interest and strengthen its statistical significance to the one percent 
level.  
Looking at the marginal effects of the estimation results from column (3), depicted in Figure 
2.2, one can see that the effect of Aid on growth turns negative when a country's leadership 
transitions from a non-western educated to a western educated one (positive change). Assuming 
that leaders educated in the West also promote cultural change, mainly “westernization,” then the 
negative sign of the coefficient can indicate initial resistance to the change from the public. This 
resistance may first increase the costs of public transactions (via reforms) and hurt growth, but 
then yield positive growth effects with the adoption of cultural change by new generations. If so, 
                                                 
53When leaders’ education in the US or the UK is not controlled for, the main and the interaction 
effect of foreign education and Aid become negative and statistically insignificant at the conventional 
levels.   
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one should expect the coefficient of the interaction term to switch the sign when the education 
variables are lagged.  
In Table 2.3, I redo the analysis of column (3), Table 2.2, but lag leaders’ education variables 
twice to allow for the effect of generational change. The coefficient of the interaction term in 
Table 2.3, column (2) becomes positive and statistically significant at the ten percent level. In 
column (3), I use the same sample from column (2) but without the education lags and confirm 
that the change in the sign is not due to the change in the sample size.  
Hence, in the long-run, the education of recipient country leaders in the West benefits the 
effectiveness of aid as it, presumably, promotes cultural transformation together with economic 
reforms. In terms of economic significance, the results in column (2), Table 2.3, show that when 
a western educated leader is in power then a one percentage change in Aid leads to a 0.3 
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Figure 2. Average marginal effects of Aid (95% Confidence Interval)
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2.7. Tests for robustness 
In Table 2.3, I test the robustness of the regression results in column (5), Table 2.2. In column 
(1), Table 2.3, I use first differenced (and lagged)      rather than that in levels. The 
coefficient of the interaction term between Aid and the       is negative and statistically 
significant at the five percent level. As one can see, the key coefficient is much larger when the 
     is first differenced. This indicates that within country changes in the      lead to much 
larger effects.
54
 However, the adjusted R-squared does not gain from this specification of first 
differencing the     , confirming that the specification in column (5), Table 2.1, is a better fit 
in terms of explained variance. In column (2), I remove the possible endogeneity of      
introduced by the aid shares and instead use average genetic distance,    , to western donors is 
calculated as follows: 
     
 
 
     
  
    ,                                                                (5) 
where      is the average genetic distance to all donors for recipient  ,      
  is the genetic 
distance between donor   and recipient   and n is the number of western donors. The sign, 
statistical significance and the magnitude of the coefficient of the interaction term is hardly 
affected when     is used instead of the      in column (2), Table 2.3. In column (3), I control 
for changes in humanitarian aid, while in column (4), I control for changes in bilateral aid from 
new DAC and non-DAC donors. The main findings are robust to the inclusion of these variables. 
In Table 2.4, I test the robustness of the results in Table 2.2 by adding control variables 
related to the power constraints of the leader. Depending on the level of democracy, the power of 
the executive might vary, and more time may be required from policy changes to the 
implementation and the realization of results.  I control for the country's democracy level, using 
unified democracy scores from Pemstein et al. (2010).  
The form of governance, such as monarchy, presidential, parliamentarian, military or 
socialist, might also matter for growth. I control for it using the Effective Executive variable from 
Banks and Wilson (2012). This is a categorical variable ranging from 1 to 5, where higher values 
correspond to military and socialist dictatorships. The next control variable is the type of leader: 
Head of the State (monarch, president, premier, military and other – i.e., general secretary in 
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communist regimes). The inclusion of these variables strengthens the statistical power of the 
interaction term up to the five percent level. In column (2), I test the robustness of the regression 
in column (4), Table 2.2 with the inclusion of the additional controls. In column (3), the leader’s 
education variable is lagged twice. As can be seen, the interaction term is positive and 
statistically significant at the five percent level, which confirms the findings in column (2), Table 
2.3. Column (4) shows that the change of the coefficient sign is not due to the sample size.  
One can argue that genetic distance is capturing differences in language, ethnicity and 
religion instead of beliefs and norms transferred from one generation to another. In Table B1, 
Appendix B, I test this by including distance in ethno-linguistic fractionalization and religion 
between donors and recipients, using data from Kolo (2012). I do not find any statistically 
significant effect of donor-recipient differences in religion, language or ethnicity on the aid-
growth nexus and the statistical significance of the interaction term of the      and Aid is 
hardly influenced by the inclusion of these variables. This implies that the intergenerationally 
transmitted characteristics are beyond ethnicity, religion and language.  
Dreher et al. (2015a) show that differences in political ideology between donors and 
recipients (alignment) matter for the aid-growth nexus. Therefore, I control for these differences 
in column (5), Appendix B Table B2, by including the political alignment variable from Dreher et 
al. (2015a) in the main regression.
55
 However, since the data on political ideology are available 
only from 1975 onwards, it reduces the sample size by 81 observations.
56
 In result, the key 
coefficient becomes statistically insignificant due to the reduced sample size rather than by the 
inclusion of the political ideology variable as shown in column (6). 
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Next, I test whether inclusion of the cultural dimensions developed by Inglehart and Welzel 
(2005) influences the coefficient of interest – the interaction between Aid and     . I include 
the World Value Surveys’ cultural dimension of well-being and authority (waves 1-5) in the main 
estimation equation. The number of observations is reduced to 152 in the panel setting, covering 
42 countries only. Since some countries step in and out in different waves, the values for the 
years where observations are absent are replaced with those before and/or after the observations. 
The results in column (2), Appendix B, Table B2, show that the key coefficient is negative and 
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 Source: Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). 
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 This result, however, does not fundamentally undermine the main findings of this study: in statistical analysis the 
true parameter is more likely to be found in larger rather than in smaller samples.  
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statistically significant at the one percent level. The coefficient of the interaction term between 
Aid and well-being is also positive but has a weak statistical significance. This outcome 
tentatively suggests that certain cultural values measured by the WVS can be part of the 
intergenerationally transmitted characteristics. However, due to the data limitations and a very 
small sample size, no strong inference can be made. 
2.8. Conclusions 
The findings of this paper empirically support the anecdotal evidence on adverse effects of the 
donor-recipient cultural differences on the aid-growth nexus. I find these results by augmenting a 
prominent aid-growth model with two proxy variables for donor-recipient cultural differences: 
aid-adjusted genetic distance and western education of a recipient country leader. As in the 
previous chapter, I introduce an interaction term between the proxy variable(s) and bilateral aid to 
an aid-growth model to find how aid’s effect on growth changes with different levels of donor-
recipient cultural differences.  
Using the estimation method of Clemens et al. (2012) for the panel data of 66 recipient 
countries from 1961-2010, averaged over 5-year periods, I find that the main effect of bilateral 
aid on growth is reduced by 0.2 percentage points when aid is increased by one percentage point 
and the aid-adjusted genetic distance by one unit. However, when an aid recipient country has a 
western educated leader it results in a positive and statistically significant effect of aid on growth 
in a long run. Robustness tests show that alternative proxy variables for donor-recipient cultural 
differences such as distance in language and ethnicity do not have statistically significant effects 
on the aid-growth nexus. 
These findings imply that the effectiveness of aid can be enhanced if donors focus on 
culturally closer regions and/or engage in long-term commitments at the local level. Moreover, 
development paradigms should be designed with greater involvement and input from local 
scholars and political leaders, who possess a deep understanding of both western and local 
culture. In addition, the movement of people between (western) donor countries and recipient 
countries and/or intense intercultural communication can relax cultural barriers to knowledge 




Table 2.1 The effect of aid-adjusted genetic distance on the aid-growth nexus 
 
  
Dependant variable: ΔGrowth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Aid 0.012 0.018        0.296**        0.399** 0.404
                 [0.084]        [0.082]        [0.140]        [0.186]        [0.287]   
Aid-adjusted genetic distance (AwGD)       -0.969**       -0.972**       -1.015**       -0.950**       -0.900** 
                 [0.436]        [0.435]        [0.438]        [0.460]        [0.452]   
Aid *AwGD       -0.204**       -0.213**       -0.183** 
                 [0.081]        [0.087]        [0.085]   
Bilateral repayments -0.446       -1.472*  
                 [0.293]        [0.870]   
Multilateral aid -0.026 0.049
                 [0.139]        [0.355]   
Multilateral repayments  -0.866       -4.231** 
                 [0.922]        [2.136]   
Aid squared -0.001
                 [0.006]   
Bilateral repayments squared 0.303
                 [0.211]   
Multilateral aid squared -0.002
                 [0.017]   
Multilateral repayments squared        1.622*  
                 [0.905]   
Initial GDP p.c. (log)       -9.129***       -9.659***       -9.098***       -9.613***       -9.757***       -9.624***       -9.568***
                 [1.387]        [1.453]        [1.458]        [1.519]        [1.532]        [1.554]        [1.546]   
Initial life expectancy (log) -0.001 -0.074 -0.001 -0.074 -0.088 -0.085 -0.09
                 [0.070]        [0.071]        [0.070]        [0.071]        [0.068]        [0.067]        [0.067]   
Openness    0.652 0.622 0.651 0.621 0.568 0.558 0.444
                 [0.441]        [0.452]        [0.442]        [0.453]        [0.455]        [0.476]        [0.497]   
Inflation (log)       -1.364***       -1.315***       -1.368***       -1.322***       -1.182***       -1.195***       -1.223***
                 [0.448]        [0.427]        [0.450]        [0.430]        [0.433]        [0.440]        [0.447]   
Initial M2/GDP -0.011 -0.03 -0.01 -0.029 -0.031 -0.029 -0.031
                 [0.022]        [0.024]        [0.022]        [0.024]        [0.023]        [0.023]        [0.023]   
Revolutions       -0.800**       -0.783**       -0.796**       -0.776**       -0.759**       -0.751**       -0.759** 
                 [0.335]        [0.336]        [0.332]        [0.333]        [0.330]        [0.327]        [0.329]   
Budget Balance/GDP 0.141 0.091 0.14 0.089 0.057 0.032 0.015
                 [0.122]        [0.136]        [0.122]        [0.136]        [0.142]        [0.140]        [0.148]   
Adj. R-Squared 0.278 0.29 0.276 0.288 0.294 0.293 0.292
Aid variables squared No No No No No No Yes
Number of Countries 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
Number of Observations 378 378 378 378 378 378 378
OLS panel estimation in first differences: country fixed effects. All regressions include period dummies. All aid variables and repayments are in 









Dependant variable: ΔGrowth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Aid 0.17 0.174 0.193        0.211*  0.286
                 [0.137]        [0.140]        [0.133]        [0.128]        [0.254]   
Ed US UK    0.472 0.551 0.374 0.261
                 [0.471]        [0.455]        [0.632]        [0.636]   
Education Level 0.035 -0.009 -0.026 -0.007
                 [0.197]        [0.198]        [0.207]        [0.202]   
Aid*ΔEd US UK       -0.290*        -0.713**       -0.811***
                 [0.167]        [0.284]        [0.312]   
Education abroad (incl. US/UK) 0.206 0.331
                 [0.667]        [0.703]   
Aid*ΔEducation abroad (incl. US/UK)        0.548*         0.623*  
                 [0.302]        [0.323]   
Adj. R-Squared 0.28 0.277 0.281 0.283 0.288
Aid variables squared No No No No Yes
Number of Countries 66 66 66 66 66
Number of Observations 378 378 378 378 378
OLS panel estimation in first differences: country fixed effects.  All regressions include period dummies. Aid denotes gross 
bilateral aid as percent of recipient's GDP and is lagged once. Control include  initial GDP p.c. (log), initial life expectancy (log), 
openness, inflation (log), initial M2/GDP, budget balance/GDP, revolutions, multilateral aid, multilateral and bilateral repayments. 
All aid variables and repayments are in percent of recipient's GDP. Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table 2.3 Lagged effects of leaders' western education on the aid-growth nexus 
 
  
Dependant variable: ΔGrowth    (1)        (2)    (3)   
Aid 0.193 0.07 0.135
                 [0.133]        [0.132]        [0.129]   
ΔEd US UK    0.551 0.437 0.42
                 [0.455]        [0.503]        [0.484]   
ΔEducation Level -0.009 -0.074 -0.058
                 [0.198]        [0.206]        [0.199]   
Aid*ΔEd US UK       -0.290*         0.320*        -0.269*  
                 [0.167]        [0.185]        [0.159]   
Education twice lagged           No            Yes             No   
Adj. R-Squared 0.281 0.306 0.304
Aid variables squared No No No
Number of Countries 66 66 66
Number of Observations 378 338 338
OLS panel estimation in first differences: country fixed effects.  All regressions include period 
dummies. Aid denotes gross bilateral aid as percent of recipient's GDP. Control variables are:  initial 
GDP p.c. (log), initial life expectancy (log), openness, inflation (log), initial M2/GDP, budget 
balance/GDP, revolutions, multilateral aid, bilateral and multilateral repayments. All aid variables and 
repayments are in percent of recipient's GDP. Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 2.4 Robustness test: Column 5, Table 2.1 
  
Dependant variable: ΔGrowth (1) (2) (3) (4)
Aid 0.056        0.290**        0.300**        0.285** 
                 [0.079]        [0.134]        [0.140]        [0.129]   
Aid-adjusted genetic distance (AwGD)       -6.340**       -1.013**       -1.010** 
                 [2.664]        [0.438]        [0.432]   
Aid*AwGD       -2.287**       -0.205**       -0.198***
                 [0.901]        [0.081]        [0.076]   
Mean Genetic Distance (GD)       -0.718*  
                 [0.405]   
Aid*GD       -0.199** 
                 [0.078]   
Humanitarian Aid -0.357
                 [2.088]   
Rest Bilateral Aid        1.237** 
                 [0.604]   
AwGD/GD first differenced (Δ)          Yes             No             No             No   
Adj. R-Squared 0.284 0.288 0.292 0.307
Number of Countries 66 66 66 66
Number of Observations 378 378 378 378
OLS panel estimation in first differences: country fixed effects. All regressions include period dummies. Aid 
denotes gross bilateral aid as percent of recipient's GDP.  Controls are: initial GDP p.c. (log), initial life 
expectancy (log), openness, inflation (log), initial M2/GDP, budget balance/GDP, revolutions. Significance 
levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 2.5 Robustness test: Table 2.2 and 2.3 
 
  
Dependant variable: Δ Growth (1) (2) (3) (4)
Aid 0.203        0.223*  0.12 0.188
                 [0.138]        [0.134]        [0.147]        [0.133]   
ΔEd US UK    0.69 0.568        1.013*  0.424
                 [0.453]        [0.619]        [0.604]        [0.621]   
ΔEducation Level -0.04 -0.041 -0.055 -0.086
                 [0.204]        [0.210]        [0.228]        [0.222]   
Aid*ΔEd US UK       -0.327**       -0.769***        0.358**       -0.699** 
                 [0.164]        [0.255]        [0.176]        [0.273]   
ΔEducation abroad 0.123 -0.74 0.083
                 [0.680]        [0.585]        [0.708]   
Aid *ΔEducation abroad (incl. US/UK)        0.573** -0.114        0.493*  
                 [0.283]        [0.160]        [0.295]   
Democracy         -1.025*        -1.033*        -1.086*        -1.161*  
                 [0.530]        [0.530]        [0.596]        [0.607]   
Effective Executive       -1.882***       -1.863***       -1.706***       -1.576***
                 [0.515]        [0.500]        [0.515]        [0.510]   
Head of State        3.005**        3.016**        2.687**        2.472*  
                 [1.342]        [1.336]        [1.266]        [1.269]   
Education lagged (2 periods) No No Yes No
Adj. R-Squared 0.306 0.309 0.327 0.329
Aid variables squared No No No No
Number of Countries 64 64 64 64
Number of Observations 357 357 320 320
OLS panel estimation in first differences: country fixed effects. All regressions include period dummies. Aid denotes gross bilateral 
aid as percent of recipient's GDP. Control variables are: initial GDP p.c. (log), initial life expectancy (log), openness, inflation (log), 
initial M2/GDP, budget balance/GDP, revolutions as well as multilateral aid, multilateral and bilateral repayments. All aid variables 
and repayments are in percent of recipient's GDP and are lagged once. Education variables are lagged and differenced. Significance 
levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Abstract: We argue that donors could improve the effectiveness of foreign aid by pursuing 
complementary and coherent non-aid policies. In particular, we hypothesize that aid has stronger 
growth effects if recipients receive more aid from donors that allow for (temporary) worker 
mobility and (more permanent) migration. We focus on overall remittances paid by the donor 
countries to proxy for worker mobility and migration. Our empirical results support the 
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The World Bank’s study “Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why?” (World Bank 
1998) and the underlying contribution of Burnside and Dollar (2000) have triggered a lively and 
ongoing debate on the role of sound economic policies in the recipient countries for foreign aid to 
have the desired effects on poverty alleviation and economic growth. It has received considerably 
less attention how donor countries could enhance the effectiveness of their aid. 
Berthélemy (2006) concluded from his analysis of selfish and altruistic motives of aid 
allocation that donors do not behave the same. Concerning donor motives and aid effectiveness, 
Bearce and Tirone (2010), Kilby and Dreher (2010) and Dreher et al. (2014) found that the 
growth impact is insignificant or even negative for politically or strategically motivated aid which 
typically provides favors to political allies, while the growth impact tends to be positive if aid is 
motivated by the need of recipients.
58
 
However, it remains open to question whether donors could improve the effectiveness of 
aid by pursuing complementary and coherent policies. As argued by Fuchs et al. (2014), foreign 
aid may be complemented or substituted by donor policies related to private financial flows, 
imports and exports of goods and services, and international migration. Here, we focus on the 
overall remittances paid by donor countries, as a proxy of (temporary) worker mobility and (more 
permanent) immigration, since the interaction between aid and remittances has received scant 
attention so far. Specifically, we hypothesize that aid has stronger growth effects if recipients 
receive more aid from donor countries with higher outflows of remittances than from donor 
countries with lower outflows of remittances.  
Section 2 sketches the analytical background of our hypothesis. Section 3 discusses 
measurement issues and justifies our focus on remittances, while Section 4 describes the method 
and data used. We present our estimation results in Section 5, and conclude in Section 6. 
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 More specifically, it has been discussed whether donors could render aid more effective by: (i) selecting sectors 
where aid is more likely to have short-term effects (Clemens et al. 2012); (ii) offering appropriate aid modalities, 
e.g., by untying aid (Clay et al. 2008), replacing loans by grants (Odedokun 2004), and providing general budget 
support instead of project-specific support (Koeberle et al. 2006); (iii) optimizing aid delivery, e.g., through non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) (Dietrich 2013, Acht et al. 2015) and so-called performance based aid 
(Svensson 2003); (iv) reducing the volatility and unpredictability of aid disbursements (Lensink and Morrissey 2000, 
Kodama 2012); and (v) improving donor coordination (Easterly 2007, Knack and Rahman 2007). 
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3.2. Why remittances matter for aid effects 
 
According to the OECD Development Centre, donor countries “must also make intelligent use of 
non-aid policies,” including migration policies, to render aid more effective; the relevant question 
for OECD policy makers is how to combine aid and non-aid policies to achieve the desired 
results most effectively (Dayton-Johnson and Katseli 2006: 1). Likewise, the view that “foreign 
aid is only one aspect of the relationship between rich and poor countries” is underlying the 
Commitment to Development Index (CDI) of the Center for Global Development (Birdsall and 
Roodman 2003: 2). This index, which has been compiled annually since 2003, includes migration 
as a major component to assess the policy coherence of donor countries.
59
 
In actual practice, however, the required policy coherence often appears to be violated by 
donor countries. For instance, some large donor countries, notably France and Japan, ranked at 
the bottom of the CDI’s 2003 scorecard on migration policies (Birdsall and Roodman 2003). De 
Haas (2005: 1269) observes that “migration and development policies generally constitute 
separate policy domains” in the donor countries, which hampers more positive links between 
migration and development in the recipient countries. It even appears that some donors regard 
foreign aid as a ‘remedy’ against migration from recipient countries.
60
 
As noted by the Center for Global Development and Foreign Policy magazine when 
launching the CDI in 2003, “at first glance, it may seem odd to include immigration policy in the 
CDI. How is the process of development advanced if thousands of Turks exit their native country 
for Germany or if millions of Mexicans cross the border into the United States? Clearly, 
migration flows hurt in some ways and help in others. On balance, however, the freer movement 
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 As noted by Birdsall and Roodman (2003: 20), “migration is one of the thorniest topics covered in the index. The 
effects of migration and migration policy on development have not been as extensively studied as those of aid and 
trade policies.” We return to the Center for Global Development’s index when discussing measurement issues in 
Section 3. 
60
 De Haas (2005) considers it a myth that foreign aid is an effective remedy against migration. See also Berthélemy 
et al. (2009) on the complex relationship between aid inflows and emigration from recipient countries. Fernández-
Huertas Moraga and Rapoport (2013) argue that existing international migration regimes are generally too restrictive 
and inefficient as they ignore important externalities. The public good nature of poverty alleviation encourages free-
riding on immigration, while restrictions are justified by apparently unbearable social and political costs. 
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of people—like the freer movement of goods—generally enhances development.”
61
 The evidence 
on positive developmental effects of migration in the sending countries has mounted since then.
62
 
According to Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport (2013: 1), “international 
migration is maybe the single most effective way to alleviate global poverty.” In quantitative 
terms, the remittances of migrants and temporary foreign workers are a much more important 
source of external financing for many developing countries than aid inflows (Gammeltoft 2002). 
However, in addition to directly contributing to external financing and poverty alleviation, donor 
countries allowing for temporary worker mobility and more permanent immigration could also 
enhance economic growth in aid recipient countries indirectly by increasing the effectiveness of 
foreign aid. 
Empirical evidence on whether liberal policies with respect to worker mobility and 
migration and higher remittances improve the effectiveness of official development aid hardly 
exists.  By contrast, there is a fairly large literature on the links between migration and private 
international transactions. Various studies address the effects of migration on international trade 
relations. Starting with the pioneering work of Gould (1994), Head and Ries (1998) and Rauch 
(2001), “evidence of a positive relationship between trade and migration has been around for 
almost two decades” (Hatzigeorgiou and Lodefalk 2015).
63
 This is typically attributed to the 
immigrants’ familiarity with business conditions and market opportunities in their country of 
birth. In addition to disseminating trade-related information and generating trust, immigrants are 
widely perceived to reduce transaction and communication costs, inter alia, through scarce 
language skills and access to local networks (see, e.g., Gould 1994, Parsons 2012, Hatzigeorgiou 
and Lodefalk 2015). Likewise, it is argued that immigrants help promote private cross-border 
financial flows, offshoring, and foreign direct investment (FDI) by providing relevant 
information, reducing uncertainty and building trust (see, e.g., Leblang 2010, Javorcik et al. 2011, 
Kugler et al. 2013). 
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 See Foreign Policy, Ranking the rich. May/ June 2003, page 64 
(http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~dcrocker/Courses/Docs/Aid%20Effectiveness.htm; accessed: January 2015). 
62
 For instance, Adams and Page (2005: 1645) find that “both international migration and remittances significantly 
reduce the level, depth, and severity of poverty in the developing world.” Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2010) report 
similar results for a sample of 33 African countries. See also various contributions on the brain drain/ gain and 
remittances to the volume edited by Czaika and Vargas-Silva (2012: Part III).  Ratha et al. (2011) review the relevant 
literature. 
63
 However, Parsons (2012) finds that the positive impact of migration on trade vanishes in a dyadic setting when 
including country-pair fixed effects to account for unobserved bilateral factors. 
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In a similar vein, one might argue that immigrants help improve the effectiveness of 
official development aid by reducing “information and trust friction” (Hatzigeorgiou and 
Lodefalk 2015). Donors could make use of the immigrants’ familiarity with local conditions and 
specific needs for aid in their home countries. Better information on specific needs could render 
aid more effective if donors adjusted the composition of aid accordingly and, thus, provided well-
targeted aid.
64
 Conversely, immigrants and possibly even temporary foreign workers tend to 
acquire skills when working in the more advanced donor countries. The poorer sending countries 
may tap into superior knowledge acquired by the diaspora abroad, especially when migrants and 
workers return home: “Access to information through the diaspora and the skills learned by 
returning migrants can improve technology, management and institutions in the sending country” 
(Ratha et al. 2011: 6) and, thereby, improve the aid recipient country’s absorptive capacity for a 
productive use of aid inflows. 
Furthermore, lobbying by foreign ethnic groups in the donor countries may render aid 
more effective and strengthen complementarities between aid and remittances. Lahiri and 
Raimondos-Møller (2000) present a theoretical model to explain the striking relationship between 
the presence of ethnic groups in the donor countries and the allocation of aid across the countries 
of origin of these groups. The authors argue that foreign ethnic groups “often lobby the (host) 
government for the benefit of the countries of their origin.” Specifically, potential investors 
among migrants living in the donor countries may lobby for particular types of aid, namely those 
which help remove critical bottlenecks and, thereby, promote the productivity of their own 
remittances. Finally, by encouraging “continuous and expanding economic relations between 
sending and receiving countries” (Grieco and Hamilton 2004: 5; emphasis added), immigrants 
may help reduce the typical volatility of aid disbursements, which have been shown to erode the 
growth effects of aid (Lensink and Morrissey 2000, Kodama 2012). 
It is questionable, however, whether immigrants and foreign workers have sufficient 
political clout to influence the aid policies of donor countries.
65
 Furthermore, compared to the 
effects of migration on international trade and private financial flows, it appears to be more 
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 The role of trust for more effective aid has been stressed by Dreher et al. (2015a). 
65
 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for having stressed this point. As discussed in more detail in Section 3, 
the proportion of illegal migration included in the available datasets is often unknown (Parsons 2012). The political 
clout of foreign ethnic groups would diminish further in donor countries whose statistical reporting does not 




difficult to reduce “information and trust friction” when it comes to the effectiveness of official 
development aid. According to the literature on trade and FDI, it is mainly skilled migrants who 
play a significant role in fostering private international flows (Head and Ries 1998, Javorcik et al. 
2011, Kugler et al. 2013). However, migrants and temporary workers from strongly aid-
dependent countries are often unskilled and may lack the knowledge and contacts needed for 
reducing transaction costs. Moreover, the dissemination of relevant information and the 
generation of trust tend to take place at the firm-level through employment of foreign workers 
and immigrants (Hatzgeorgiou and Lodefalk 2015). A comparable transmission mechanism is 
largely lacking at the level of official bureaucracies administering foreign aid. 
Consequently, one might suspect that it is mainly through the remittances of temporary 
foreign workers and migrants residing more permanently in donor countries that aid may become 
more effective.
66
 Approximating the developing world of aid recipients to include all countries 
outside the donor community, the available evidence suggests that about two thirds of donors’ 
overall outflows of remittances are transferred to aid recipients.
67
 An increase in donors’ overall 
outflows of remittances can, thus, be reasonably assumed to render complementarities between 
aid and remittances more likely, even though bilateral data on remittances are not available for 
most of our period of observation so that complementarities cannot be assessed at the bilateral 
level for specific pairs of donors and recipients.
68
  
The literature offers several arguments that the interaction of aid with remittances might 
have positive growth effects in the aid recipient countries. Aid and remittances can be 
complementary means of financing. While remittances are private flows and primarily benefit the 
families of migrants in the sending country, “philanthropic remittances” are not uncommon 
(Ratha et al. 2011: 5). In other words, the diaspora contributes to social and economic 
development at home by co-financing projects in education, health, and community infrastructure 
(e.g., Goldring 2004). Complementarities between aid and remittances may even exist if projects 
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 It should be noted that temporary workers, e.g., in the construction sector of Arab donor countries and in 
agriculture of some European donor countries, often contribute considerably to the outflows of overall remittances 
from donor countries. 
67
 According to recent World Bank data on bilateral remittances (http://go.worldbank.org/092X1CHHD0), non-donor 
countries received 63 percent of the overall outflows of remittances from DAC donors included in our sample in 
2010, i.e., the latest year of our period of observation. The corresponding share was still higher (about 80 percent) for 
non-DAC donors included in our sample. Even though we miss some ‘new’ donors in our sample (see Section 4 for 
details), the above approximation appears to be reasonable since new donors such as China and India were important 
aid recipients throughout most of our period of observation. 
68
 As we discuss in Section 3, bilateral data on remittances are available only since 2010. 
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in education and health are purely aid-financed. According to Ratha et al. (2011), a growing body 
of evidence suggests that the private income from remittances is largely spent on education and 
health, rather than conspicuous consumption. In other words, remittances tend to fuel higher 
demand for productivity enhancing social services that aid helped to provide.
69
 
Similar complementarities between aid and remittances have been suggested in other 
fields. De Haas (2005) reports that migrant households often tend to have a higher propensity to 
invest in agriculture and other private enterprises than non-migrant households. According to 
McKenzy and Yang (2014: 21), “a large variety of initiatives are ongoing to channel migrant 
remittances towards longer-run household investments.” Aid and invested remittances could then 
mutually reinforce each other in promoting economic growth. Aid may help remove critical 
bottlenecks to a more productive use of invested remittances, e.g., by improving the recipient 
country’s infrastructure and institutions. Conversely, higher local investments financed by 
remittances could boost the growth effects of aid-financed infrastructure and institutions by 
making better use of facilities and business opportunities.
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3.3. Measurement issues 
 
As stressed by Roodman (2013: 40), “there are data problems, including the lack of 
comprehensive information on remittances and illegal immigration, and a paucity of 
internationally comparable information on rich countries’ migration policies.” The above noted 
sub-index on migration policies, which is part of the Center for Global Development’s overall 
Commitment to Development Index, has much to recommend from a conceptual point of view. 
The index combines several indicators supposed to capture important aspects of the migration 
policies of donor countries and their relevance for aid-recipient countries. The 2013 edition of the 
index is based on the following indicators: gross migrant inflows, weighted by poverty of sending 
countries, in percent of the donor country’s population; students from developing countries, in 
percent of all foreign students in the donor country; refugee population and asylum applications 
per billion US$ of donor country’s GDP (Roodman 2013). 
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 This reasoning implies that higher remittances could improve the effectiveness of aid from any donor (not only the 
donor with higher remittances). 
70
 In a similar vein, Dayton-Johnson and Katseli (2006: 21) argue that aid could diffuse the benefits of migration 
better: “Remittances might expand economic opportunities in migrants’ home regions, but with bad roads or 
telephone service, it might be difficult for workers elsewhere in the country to move to those regions and benefit 
from expanded opportunities.” 
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For several reasons, however, the CGD’s index of migration cannot be used in our 
empirical analysis below. It is available only since 2003. Furthermore, within this rather short 
period, the construction of the index has been modified repeatedly – in terms of coverage and 
exact definition of indicators included. For instance, the 2013 edition of the index removed two 
indicators previously used, including the change in the stock of non-native residents without 
tertiary education (Roodman 2013). These modifications often resulted in significant changes in 
the ranking of donors countries. The United States provides an example: it appears to be largely 
due to changes in index construction that the US ranking fluctuated heavily between position 14 
(among 21 donor countries) in 2003, position 2 in 2004, and position 12 in 2005.
71
  
Given the problems of constructing an index of migration in a consistent way over a 
sufficiently long period of time, one has to revert to simpler proxies in empirical panel analyses. 
While the stock or flow of migrants is widely used in the literature on the determinants of 
international trade and FDI,
72
 we focus on the remittances paid by donor countries in the present 
context of donor quality and aid effectiveness.  
Importantly, using remittances as a proxy of donor quality has a limitation in common 
with the CGD’s index: This measure does not vary across recipient countries. Bilateral data on 
the remittances paid by donor countries to specific recipient countries are not available for a 
sufficiently long period of time.
73
 In contrast, origin-destination matrices are principally available 
on migration.
74
 However, these matrices are typically based on census data collected in ten-year 
intervals.
75
 Consequently, extensive interpolation would be required to allow for a meaningful 
panel analysis on aid effectiveness. Furthermore, while “every effort has been made to remove 
refugees” from the data on migration provided by Özden et al. (2011), “it is still likely that a 
fairly large proportion of illegal migrants are captured in national censuses” (Parsons 2012: 13). 
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 For details see the annual briefs and the related technical papers available from the CGD’s website: 
http://www.cgdev.org/initiative/commitment-development-index/index (accessed: June 2015). 
72
 See the references given to this literature ion Section 2 above. 
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 The World Bank publishes bilateral remittance matrices only since recently; matrices for the years 2010-2014 are 
available from: http://go.worldbank.org/092X1CHHD0 (accessed: June 2015). The World Bank’s estimates of 
bilateral remittances use migrant stocks, host-country incomes and origin-country incomes, based on the 
methodology of Ratha and Shaw (2007). See also Roodman (2004: 33) on the inflows and outflows of worker 
remittances reported in the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics: “The inflow numbers are not disaggregated by 
source, and the outflow numbers are not disaggregated by destination.” 
74
 For details, see Özden et al. (2011) and the OECD database available from: 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG# (accessed: June 2015). 
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 Note that Kugler et al. (2013) use bilateral data on migration for just two points in time, 1990 and 2000. Parsons 




Data on international migrant stocks reported in the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators, with the United Nations Population Division given as the ultimate source, include 
refugees.
76
 Data from the same source on remittances paid by donor countries comprise personal 
transfers and compensation of employees.
77
 While this measure is also far from perfect as a proxy 
of donor quality, its major advantage is the availability of sufficiently long and consistent time 
series on an annual basis. 
Against this backdrop, we focus on remittances as our preferred proxy of donor quality in 
our empirical analysis below. As shown in Table 3.1, the donors with the highest remittances in 
our sample are Luxembourg, Kuwait, Switzerland, Israel and Belgium. In particular, the first 
three of these donors are outliers in terms of average remittances paid throughout the period of 
observation, in percent of the donors’ GDP, considering that remittances typically accounted for 
less than one percent of GDP.
78
 For some donor countries in Central Europe and the Baltics, but 
also for Japan and Turkey, remittances did not even reach 0.1 percent of GDP. At the same time 
these countries often had small overall aid budgets, but small overall aid budgets are also 
observed for several donor countries with relatively high remittances (e.g., the Czech Republic, 
Korea, and some non-DAC donors in Table 3.1). Conversely, larger aid budgets go along with 
relatively low remittances in Sweden. Taken together, we observe considerable heterogeneity 
within our sample when comparing remittances and aid in percent of donors’ GDP. 
3.4. Data and method 
 
It has proven notoriously difficult to identify the impact of foreign aid on economic growth in the 
recipient countries. While the endogeneity of foreign aid is generally accepted, the 
instrumentation strategies of empirical analyses appear to be inappropriate to mitigate 
endogeneity concerns. Dreher et al. (2014) argue that widely used instrumentation strategies 
relying on the recipient countries’ population size or on internal (GMM-style) instruments 
typically violate the exclusion restriction. Another strategy relying on bilateral political relations, 
e.g., as reflected in voting coincidence in the United Nations General Assembly, can be regarded 
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 For details see: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.TOTL.ZS (accessed: June 2015). 
77
 For details see: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BM.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT (accessed: June 2015). 
78
 Hence, we test the robustness of our baseline results to the exclusion of donors with particularly high remittances 
in percent of GDP in Section 5 below. 
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as problematic when the donors’ motive to grant aid influences the effectiveness of aid.
79
 
Likewise, Bazzi and Clemens (2013) conclude that previous studies on aid effectiveness employ 
weak instruments. 
Clemens et al. (2012: 591) deliberately “avoid poor-quality instrumental variables and 
instead address potential biases from reverse and simultaneous causation by the more transparent 
methods of lagging and differencing.” They suggest first-differencing in order to eliminate 
omitted variable bias due to unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. By lagging aid by one 
period, Clemens et al. (2012) assess whether economic growth follows aid inflows. In other 
words, they assess whether aid Granger-causes growth.  
We follow the approach of Clemens et al. (2012) in our empirical analysis below even 
though it has been criticized for several reasons by Roodman (2015), notably for failing to 
remove contemporaneous endogeneity. First-differencing removes omitted-variable bias from 
time-invariant factors. In contrast, first-differencing does not address omitted-variable bias from 
time-variant characteristics of recipient countries. For instance, donors may grant more aid to a 
newly elected government that initiates growth promoting reforms. Higher growth induced by 
local reforms could then be spuriously attributed to foreign aid (see also Dreher et al. 2015b). 
Generally speaking, Granger causality would not necessarily reflect causal effects of aid on 
growth in the strict sense.
80
 While Roodman (2015: 269) agrees that “instrumenting aid is 
difficult,” he recommends reducing “endogeneity by twice-lagging aid when regressing in 
differences.” 
Arguably, the problems of identifying the growth effects of aid per se are less serious in 
the present context of assessing whether the growth effects depend on complementary donor 
policies, as reflected in overall remittances. Even if the direct effect of aid on growth is biased, 
this does not automatically imply a systematic bias for our variable of principal interest, i.e., the 
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 Brückner (2013) uses variations in rainfall and international commodity price shocks as instruments for growth in 
a two-step procedure in order to assess the causal effects of aid on growth for a relatively small sample of least 
developed recipient countries. In the first step, he estimates the effect of growth on aid using rainfalls and 
international commodity price shocks as instruments to generate exogenous variation in GDP per capita growth. In 
the second step, the residual variation in aid that is not driven by GDP per capita growth is used as an instrument for 
aid to estimate by 2SLS the effect of aid on economic growth. The suitability of variations in rainfall and 
international commodity price shocks as instruments is open to debate, however, once the sample is extended to 
include the whole spectrum of low- and middle-income aid recipients. 
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 It should be noted that Clemens et al. (2012: 600) explicitly acknowledge this limitation. 
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interaction between aid and the donors’ outflows of remittances.
81
 All the same, we perform an 
additional estimation with an extended lag of two periods for the aid variable to account for 
Roodman’s (2015) above noted critique of the approach of Clemens et al. (2012). 
Specifically, we base our analysis on Clemens et al.’s (2012) permutations of the study of 
Rajan and Subramanian (2008) which figures most prominently in the recent literature on aid and 
growth. We then extend the specification by adding our variable of principal interest, the quality 
of recipient country i’s donors in terms of overall remittances paid by the donors to all countries 
(DonQual), and the interaction of this measure with the aid variable. This results in the following 
reduced-form empirical model at the country-period level: 
 
ΔGrowthi,t = α+βΔAidi,t-1+γΔDonQuali,t-1+δΔAidi,t-1*ΔDonQuali,t-1+ζΔXi,t+εi,t  (1) 
 
where Growthi,t is recipient country i’s average yearly growth of GDP per capita over the five-
year period t. Aidi,t-1 denotes the amount of bilateral aid, in percent of the recipient country’s 
GDP, disbursed in the previous five-year period.
82
 
DonQuali,t-1 reflects the quality of the average donor in recipient country i at time t-1, by 
weighting the amount of aid a country receives from donor j with j’s overall remittances paid: 
                                  
 
       (2) 
where         is the aid share of donor   in recipient country  ’s total bilateral aid in period t-1;   
           represents the amount of remittances, paid by the donor country in percent of its 
GDP.
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 As mentioned in Section 3 above, Remit varies only across donor countries j as bilateral 
data on remittances paid to specific recipient countries i are not available for our sample of donor 
countries for a sufficiently long period of time. The variation of DonQual by recipient country 
stems exclusively from the varying aid shares of i’s different donors. This implies that the 
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 According to Nunn and Qian (2012), “interacting an arguably exogenous term [here: donors’ remittances paid to 
all countries, rather than bilateral flows] with one that is potentially endogenous [here: bilateral aid], can be 
interpreted as exogenous since we directly control for the main effect of the endogenous variable.” This reasoning 
resembles the logic of a difference-in-differences estimation (Nunn and Qian 2014). In a similar vein, Kugler et al. 
(2013: 4) argue that focusing on the differential impact of a potentially endogenous variable renders omitted variable 
bias less likely since a possible confounder would have to “explain not just the main effect but also the differential 
effects.” Dreher et al. (2014: 3) follow this logic by distinguishing the growth effects of politically motivated aid 
from the effects of all aid, without offering “recipes to estimate a causal effect of all aid on growth.” 
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 Note that we account for multilateral aid as a control variable. 
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 We are most grateful to Andreas Fuchs for sharing his data with us. 
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interaction between Aid and DonQual in equation (1) captures whether aid is more effective in 
promoting growth when donors with higher outflows of (overall) remittances contribute more to 
recipient country i’s total aid receipts. 
All regressions are in first differences and account for the control variables used in the 
original study of Rajan and Subramanian (2008), denoted X, which we include 
contemporaneously (as in Clemens et al. 2012): (log) initial GDP per capita, initial trade policy 
index (the well-known Sachs-Warner index, extended by Wacziarg and Welch), initial life 
expectancy, (log) inflation, initial M2/GDP, budget balance/GDP, revolutions, and period 
dummies.
84
 In some specifications we additionally include aid squared to test for decreasing 
returns to aid, following Clemens et al. (2012).
85
 Finally, ε is the error term. The standard errors 
in all our estimations are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by recipient country. 
Equation (1) is estimated for a sample of 70 aid recipient countries. The sample includes 
all countries with sufficient data availability listed by the OECD’s Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) as recipient countries at the beginning of our period of observation. Appendix 
C, Table C3, lists the recipient countries included in our baseline estimation. The calculation of 
donor quality according to equation (2) is based on a sample of 38 donor countries. As can be 
seen from the list in Table 3.1, the donor sample includes all 29 member countries of the OECD’s 
DAC (as of 2015) and nine non-DAC donors with sufficient data availability. 
3.5. Results and robustness 
 
Table 3.2 presents our baseline regression results covering the 1985-2010 period.
86
 It should be 
recalled that all data are averaged over five years. Our dependent variable is the (change in the) 
growth rate of real GDP per capita. The explanatory variables of major interest are: (the change 
in) gross bilateral official development assistance as a percentage of the recipient country’s GDP 
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 Rajan and Subramanian (2008) also include time-invariant variables which are dropped here by taking differences. 
See Appendix C, Table C1 and Table C2, for summary statistics as well as detailed variables descriptions and data 
sources. 
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 At the same time, we perform additional estimations with a reduced set of control variables; see below for details. 
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 The time dimension of our sample is limited by data availability, notably the availability of consistent data on 
remittances from World Development Indicators (2013). 
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(Aid), (the change) in the aid-weighted remittances paid by the donor countries of a particular 
recipient country (DonQual), and the interaction between these two variables.
87
  
For a start, column (1) of Table 3.2 does not account for DonQual.  As can be seen, Aid 
enters with a negative sign, but proves to be statistically insignificant at conventional levels. This 
is in line with the original finding of Rajan and Subramanian (2008), according to whom aid per 
se is not effective in stimulating growth in the recipient countries. The results on the control 
variables taken from Rajan and Subramanian (2008) are similar to those in Dreher et al. (2015a), 
who also employ the approach of Clemens et al. (2012) by taking first differences and lagging 
aid. While several variables are insignificant at conventional levels, the coefficients on Initial 
GDP p.c. (log), Inflation (log) and Revolutions have negative signs as expected and are 
significant at the five percent level or better. 
In column (2) we include DonQual and the interaction of Aid with DonQual. The 
estimation in column (3) includes the aid variables in squared terms to account for decreasing 
returns to aid, while the estimation in column (4) also accounts for the interaction of Aid in 
squared terms with DonQual. The results on the control variables used by Rajan and 
Subramanian (2008) are hardly affected by these modifications, compared to the basic 
specification in column (1).  
As concerns our variables of principal interest, the coefficients on both Aid per se and 
DonQual per se are statistically insignificant at conventional levels. However, we find significant 
and positive interactions between aid and DonQual in terms of aid-weighted remittances paid by 
donors, at least at the five percent level. This supports our hypothesis that bilateral aid is more 
likely to have positive growth effects when recipient countries receive aid mainly from donor 
countries with higher outflows of remittances. 
We are particularly interested in the marginal effect of aid on growth over the whole 
range of DonQual. We calculate the marginal effect of ΔAid which is equal to β + δ ΔDonQuali,t-1 
(according to equation 1), based on the regression results in column (2) of Table 3.2. Figure 3.1 
portrays the marginal effect, together with the 95 percent confidence interval. The figure clearly 
reveals that the growth impact of aid improves with higher remittances – or, more precisely, the 
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 In addition to the control variables taken from Rajan and Subramanian (2008), we also control for gross 
multilateral aid as well as repayments of (bilateral and multilateral) aid in Table 2. However, these additional control 
variables typically enter statistically insignificant (except for multilateral repayments when accounting for squared 
aid inflows and repayments). 
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more aid inflows recipients receive from donor countries with higher remittances – as evident 
from the positive and statistically significant coefficient of the corresponding interaction term (δ).   
Specifically, assume that aid is increased by one percentage point. This increase in aid 
raises the growth rate by 0.7 percentage points if DonQual, i.e., aid-weighted remittances, 
increases by one percentage point, compared to no change in DonQual. As can be seen in Figure 
3.1, the confidence intervals widen to the left from the point of zero on the x-axis. This implies 
that the effect of aid on growth becomes insignificant with negative changes in DonQual.  
We conclude from column (2) of Table 3.2 that the effectiveness of aid in promoting 
growth in the recipient countries depends considerably on the donors’ outflows of remittances. 
This finding also holds when accounting for aid in squared terms (column 3) plus the interaction 
between squared aid and DonQual (column 4). Interestingly, these extensions do not point to 
decreasing returns to aid; neither do they suggest that the impact of DonQual on the effectiveness 
of aid depends in a non-linear way on the amount of aid. 
We test the robustness of our major results in several ways. First, we employ the 
specification of Burnside and Dollar (2000), instead of the specification of Rajan and 
Subramanian (2008). In other words, we replace all control variables X in equation (1) taken from 
Rajan and Subramanian by the control variables used by Burnside and Dollar, whereas all other 
characteristics of equation (1) are left unchanged. For the sake of brevity, we do not show the 
results with the alternative specification of Burnside and Dollar (2000). However, the marginal 




Second, we report two estimations based on parsimonious specifications of equation (1) in 
Table 3.3.
89
 In column (2), we drop all control variables that proved to be statistically 
insignificant in Table 3.2. In column (1), we even drop the three statistically significant control 
variables from Table 3.2 (Initial GDP p.c., Inflation and Revolutions).  Not surprisingly, the 
adjusted R
2
 declines considerably when excluding all control variables. Importantly, however, 
our major results hold in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.3. In particular, the interaction between 
Aid and DonQual is hardly affected and continues to be statistically significant at the one percent 
level. 
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 See the working paper version of this article for details and additional figures. 
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Third, we address the above noted concern that first differencing, as suggested by 
Clemens et al. (2012), is insufficient to account for the endogeneity of aid. Specifically, we 
follow Roodman’s (2014) advice to lag the aid variable by two periods, rather than just one 
period, in column (3) of Table 3.3. Employing the specification of equation (1) as in column (2) 
of Table 3.2, there are two notable changes when lagging aid twice. First, the effect of Aid per se 
becomes significantly negative at the five percent level. Second, the size of the coefficient on the 
interaction of Aid and DonQual is somewhat smaller compared to the estimation with aid lagged 
just once. Importantly, however, the interaction continues to be statistically significant at the one 
percent level. In other words, we still find that aid is more likely to have positive growth effects 
when recipients receive aid mainly from donors with higher outflows of remittances. 
Fourth, we exclude non-DAC and non-traditional DAC donors from the sample of donor 
countries. As shown in Section 3, some of these donors are major sources of workers’ 
remittances. Thus, one might suspect that our results are mainly driven by these donor countries. 
This is not the case, however. The results from column (2) of Table 3.2 hold when DonQual is 
based on remittances only from traditional DAC members. As can be seen in column (1) of Table 
3.4, the interaction of Aid and DonQual is statistically significant at the one percent level and the 
coefficient of the interaction term is of similar size when non-DAC and non-traditional DAC 
donors are excluded from our sample.  
Fifth, we assess whether our basic results are driven by traditional DAC donors with 
relatively high remittances as percentage of their GDP.
90
 In column (2) of Table 3.4, we exclude 
Luxembourg with outstandingly high remittances, followed by those traditional DAC donors that 
rank next in terms of remittances (columns 3-6). Independent of the DAC donor excluded, the 
interaction of Aid and DonQual is statistically significant at the one percent level and the size of 
the coefficient of the interaction term is hardly affected compared to column (2) in Table 3.2. 
Finally, we exclude either the quartile of recipient countries with the lowest growth or the 
quartile with the highest growth from our sample to test whether the complementarity between 
aid and the donors’ outflows of remittances is restricted to a particular sub-group of aid 
recipients. As shown in Table 3.4, the statistical significance of the interaction of Aid and 
DonQual weakens to the ten percent level when excluding the recipients with the lowest growth 
                                                 
90
 Note that new DAC donors such as Israel and the Czech Republic, which joined the DAC after 2009, were 
excluded together with non-DAC donors in column (1) of Table 3.4. 
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(column 7). The results are hardly affected, compared to the full sample of recipients, when 
excluding the recipients with the highest growth (column 8). Taken together, this could be taken 
as an indication that it is mainly the slow growing recipient countries that benefit from the 
complementarity of aid and donors’ outflows of remittances. 
3.6. Conclusions 
We argue that donors could improve the effectiveness of foreign aid by pursuing complementary 
and coherent non-aid policies. In particular, we hypothesize that aid has stronger growth effects if 
recipients receive more aid from donors that allow for (temporary) worker mobility and are open 
to immigration. We focus on overall remittances paid by the donor countries to proxy for worker 
mobility and immigration. We follow Clemens et al. (2012) and estimate the aid-growth nexus in 
first differences. At the same time, we account for Roodman’s (2015) critique of this approach by 
performing an additional estimation with longer lags of the aid variable in order to reduce 
endogeneity concerns. Our empirical results support the hypothesis that the donors’ outflows of 
remittances strengthen the growth effects of foreign aid. 
Our findings have important implications for both the donors and recipients of foreign 
aid, even though it has to be kept in mind that remittances are far from perfect in capturing the 
donors’ policies with respect to (temporary) worker mobility and (more permanent) immigration. 
Political resistance in various donor countries against more worker mobility and immigration not 
only involves costs for the donors themselves (e.g., in terms of access to foreign skills and 
improving the age structure of the workforce) but also for the recipients of development aid. In 
particular, the effectiveness of aid is eroded if official financial generosity is misconceived as an 
alternative to offering better employment opportunities for foreign workers and migrants, 
resulting in higher remittances, which should be of concern at least for altruistic donors. From the 
perspective of aid recipients, it appears that maximizing aid inflows is unlikely to have the 
desired effects on economic growth and poverty alleviation unless development cooperation with 
donors is broadened to cover complementary (non-aid) policies such as international worker 
mobility and migration. 
Our analysis of the complementarity of aid and donors’ outflows of remittances suggests 
two avenues of future research. On the one hand, taking a broader perspective by accounting for 
various non-aid policies may help identify further complementarities. This research direction 
would be closely related to the Commitment to Development Index (CDI) of the Center for 
80 
 
Global Development, which covers various policy areas that could complement aid and, thereby, 
result in a coherent approach of helping the poor. On the other hand, further research may take 
the opposite direction to identify the driving forces underlying the complementarity between aid 
and remittances. Refined analyses, including micro-level surveys, could offer important insights 
on the role of remittances, the acquisition of superior skills and knowledge by (returning) workers 
and migrants, and lobbying by foreign ethnic groups in the donor countries for improving the 
effectiveness of aid. Furthermore, once sufficiently long time series of bilateral data on 
remittances become available, one might consider the interaction between aid and remittances 
from the same donor and, alternatively, the interaction with remittances from other donors. This 
would help overcome a limitation of our analysis above, by making it possible to assess whether 





Figure 3.1 Marginal effects of aid on growth as DonQual changes  
Note: Based on the regression results in column 2 of Table 3.2. Solid line in the graph shows the 
marginal effect of ΔAid which is equal to β + δ ΔDonQuali,t-1 (according to equation 1), based on 





























Table 3.1 DAC and non-DAC donors: Remittances and aid in percent of GDP 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on World Bank Development Indicators and the OECD-DAC 
Aid Statistics Database. 
DAC Remit/GDP Aid/GDP
Australia 0.236 0.253  
Austria 0.428 0.190  
Belgium 1.013 0.254  
Canada 0.308 0.187  
Czech Republic 0.869 0.034  
Denmark 0.470 0.384  
Finland 0.062 0.168  
France 0.483 0.344  
Germany 0.536 0.260  
Great Britain 0.156 0.195  
Greece 0.237 0.059  
Ireland 0.458 0.094  
Island 0.274 0.072  
Israel 1.326 0.132  
Italy 0.216 0.097  
Japan 0.050 0.226  
Korea 0.400 0.030  
Luxembourg 15.623 0.330  
Netherlands 0.625 0.458  
New Zealand 0.674 0.105  
Norway 0.428 0.398  
Poland 0.206 0.019  
Portugal 0.269 0.161  
Slovakia 0.053 0.022  
Slovenia 0.270 0.029  
Spain 0.261 0.139  
Sweden 0.149 0.366  
Switzerland 2.926 0.151  

















Dependent variable: ΔGrowth (1) (2) (3) (4)
Aid -0.100 -0.171 -0.337 -0.369
                 [0.155]        [0.154]        [0.280]        [0.306]   
DonQual (Remittances/GDP) 0.356 0.251 0.638
                 [1.372]        [1.372]        [1.538]   
Aid*DonQual        0.860***        0.834***        1.248** 
                 [0.197]        [0.190]        [0.606]   
Aid squared*DonQual -0.016
                 [0.019]   
Aid squared 0.007 0.008
     [0.006]        [0.007]   
Bilateral repayments squared 0.217 0.216
                 [0.247]        [0.249]   
Multilateral aid squared -0.018 -0.020
                 [0.015]        [0.016]   
Multilateral repayments squared        1.857**        1.858** 
                 [0.730]        [0.741]   
Multilateral aid 0.069 0.201 0.559 0.581
                 [0.151]        [0.158]        [0.382]        [0.399]   
Bilateral repayments 0.092 0.066 -0.674 -0.671
                 [0.394]        [0.370]        [1.095]        [1.096]   
Multilateral repayments -0.623 0.304       -3.673*        -3.774*  
                 [0.922]        [0.890]        [1.968]        [1.973]   
Initial GDP p.c. (log)       -8.680***       -8.528***       -8.588***       -8.642***
                 [1.098]        [1.222]        [1.206]        [1.224]   
Initial life expectancy 0.008 -0.003 -0.015 -0.020
                 [0.075]        [0.072]        [0.067]        [0.066]   
Openness 0.834 0.737 0.679 0.694
                 [0.589]        [0.582]        [0.596]        [0.600]   
Inflation (log)       -1.127***       -1.251***       -1.228***       -1.219***
                 [0.376]        [0.453]        [0.437]        [0.440]   
Initial M2/GDP 0.005 -0.021 -0.025 -0.024
                 [0.013]        [0.024]        [0.024]        [0.024]   
Budget balance/GDP 0.145 0.138 0.135 0.134
                 [0.123]        [0.136]        [0.140]        [0.139]   
Revolutions       -0.855**       -0.920**       -0.901**       -0.894** 
                 [0.389]        [0.366]        [0.369]        [0.370]   
Adj. R-Squared 0.224 0.262 0.264 0.262
Number of Countries 70 70 70 70
Number of Observations 257 257 257 257
OLS panel estimation in first differences following the specification of Rajan and Subramanian (2008) as in 
Clemens et al. (2012). All aid and repayment variables are calculated as % of GDP and are lagged. All 
regressions include period (5-year) dummies. Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. Standard 
errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by recipient country.
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Table 3.3 Robustness tests for Column 2, Table 3.2, excluding control variables and lagging aid 
twice 
 
Dependent variable: ΔGrowth (1) (2) (3)
Aid 0.043 -0.081       -0.159** 
                 [0.073]        [0.076]        [0.071]   
DonQual (Remittances/GDP) 0.059 0.309 1.219
                 [1.465]        [1.347]        [1.294]   
Aid*DonQual        0.728***        0.786***        0.661***
                 [0.196]        [0.172]        [0.210]   
Multilateral aid 0.097
                 [0.092]   
Bilateral repayments -0.202
                 [0.237]   
Multilateral repayments -0.395
                 [0.709]   
Initial GDP p.c. (log)       -8.879***       -7.669***
                 [1.214]        [1.376]   
Initial life expectancy 0.022
                 [0.080]   
Openness 0.813
                 [0.575]   
Inflation (log)       -1.304***       -1.798***
                 [0.404]        [0.613]   
Initial M2/GDP -0.011
                 [0.022]   
Budget balance/GDP 0.106
                 [0.121]   
Revolutions       -0.940**       -0.925** 
                 [0.387]        [0.354]   
Adj. R-Squared 0.021 0.269 0.347
Number of Countries 70 70 67
Number of Observations 257 257 192
First differenced Yes Yes Yes
Aid twice lagged No No Yes
OLS panel estimation in first differences following the specification of Rajan and 
Subramanian (2008) as in Clemens et al. (2012). All aid and repayment variables are 
calculated as % of GDP and are lagged. All regressions include period (5-year) 
dummies. Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. Standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by recipient country.
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Dependent variable: ΔGrowth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Aid -0.151 -0.156 -0.188 -0.220 -0.173 -0.171 -0.131 -0.154
                 [0.178]        [0.150]        [0.157]        [0.169]        [0.161]        [0.154]        [0.149]        [0.140]   
DonQual (Remittances/GDP) -0.209 0.696 0.486 0.670 0.451 0.368 0.318 0.049
                 [2.497]        [1.487]        [1.405]        [1.476]        [1.375]        [1.375]        [1.505]        [0.984]   
Aid*DonQual        1.064***        0.910***        0.910***        0.972***        0.875***        0.861***        0.637*         0.761***
     [0.369]        [0.207]        [0.207]        [0.237]        [0.205]        [0.198]        [0.343]        [0.172]   
Adj. R-Squared 0.226 0.259 0.265 0.265 0.261 0.262 0.404 0.335
Number of Countries 70 70 70 70 70 70 68 67
Number of Observations 257 257 257 257 257 257 198 206
OLS panel estimation in first differences following the specification of Rajan and Subramanian (2008) as in Clemens et al. (2012). All regressions include period (5-year) dummies. 
Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. All control variables from Table 2 are included in the regressions. Traditional DAC donors are defined as DAC members as of 






This section reports results for a number of extensions and tests for robustness. We replicate the 
main results focusing on Clemens et al.’s (2012) permutation of the regressions of Burnside and 
Dollar (2000). These data are averages over four rather than five years, and we extended them to 
cover the 1975-2009 period before differencing and lagging.
91
 
We modify the way how we deal with repayments of aid. In the main regressions, we 
focused on gross ODA, controlling for repayments. Here, we replace the explanatory variable to 
be net rather than gross disbursements of ODA.  
Our results might be affected by the omission of aid from non-traditional donors. 
Unfortunately, data for non-DAC donors are only available for recent years and, unlike 
multilateral aid, are therefore not included in our main regressions. We test robustness to 
including data from the arguably largest emerging donor, China, for the 2000-2010 period 
(available for African recipient countries exclusively, taken from Strange et al. 2013) as well as 
available bilateral aid data from other emerging donors such as India (for the 2009-2010 period), 
Saudi Arabia (starting in the 1980s), South Africa (for 2009) and Taiwan (starting in the 1980s). 
We set missing data to zero for periods and countries where they are unavailable, to be able to 
include these data in our regressions. While thus not providing a reasonable estimate of the effect 
of emerging donor aid, this provides an important robustness test for the stability of our variable 
of interest. 
We further control for the amount of humanitarian aid a country receives, taken from the 
OECD’s DAC aid statistics. Humanitarian aid is arguably less effective in raising growth 
compared to other forms of aid. In fact, it is not given to promote growth, but to alleviate 
humanitarian disaster. Controlling for humanitarian aid might thus increase the precision of our 
estimates. We code this variable to include food aid also, coded as the percentage of the total 
(bilateral and multilateral) humanitarian aid in the recipient country’s GDP. 
We control for a number of additional variables. First, we account for the estimated costs 
from natural disasters in a country and period as an additional indicator of need, taken from the 
International Disaster Database. Second, we control for (log) refugee inflows (with data taken 
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 The year 2010 is not covered here due to averaging over four-year-periods. Therefore, 2006-2009 represents the 
latest period, while 2006-2010 is the latest period for Rajan and Subramanian (2008). 
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from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and, third, for civil wars (taken from 
UCDP/PRIO). Fourth, we control for bilateral trade (exports plus imports) with a recipient 
country’s donors and FDI from the donors (both as a share of recipient country GDP, based on 
bilateral trade and FDI data taken from Barbieri et al. 2009 and UNCTAD, respectively). 
Alternatively, fifth, we account for trade-weighted and FDI-weighted ideological alignment, 
calculated in analogy to our aid-weighted alignment index above (and taken from the same 
sources). Sixth, we control for regional interactions with aid since governments of certain 
political ideology may be more common in particular regions (focusing on East Asia and Pacific, 
Latin America & the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan 
Africa). Seventh, we control for multilateral aid/GDP*Alignment, and eighth, for perceived 
corruption and democracy (from the ICRG and Cheibub et al. 2010, respectively). 
While we believe that the effect of ideological alignment should arise from the level of 
ALIGN rather than changes, we include ALIGN in differences rather than levels in our 
regressions. This is because using the variable in differences might alleviate concerns of spurious 
regression, given that such specification removes country-fixed effects that might be correlated 
with other omitted time-invariant country-specific influences.
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We split the sample in a number of ways. We separately investigate the Cold War and 
post-Cold War periods to investigate potential differences between the two.
93
 We distinguish 
democracies from autocracies, following Kosack (2003), among others, and more corrupt 
countries from less corrupt ones (separating the two groups according to the median).
94
 We also 
investigate the effect of ideological alignment for countries with good policies compared to those 
without good policies, following the suggestion of Burnside and Dollar (2000).
95
 We provide p-
values testing the equality of coefficients for our variable of interest between the respective 
samples (in brackets in Table A4). 
Table A4 shows the results for most robustness tests. To reduce clutter, only the 
coefficient of the interaction between aid and ALIGN is shown, focusing on the specification in 
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 Note however that we already reported in the main text that our results are robust to using country-fixed effects 
regressions instead of first differences regressions. 
93
 Several authors note that aid might be less effective during the Cold War, due to the prevalence of geo-strategic 
motives in the allocation of aid (e.g., Headey 2008, Bearce and Tirone 2010). 
94
 We use the indicator from Cheibub et al. (2010) to identify democracies and the index of perceived corruption 
from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
95
 We use Rajan and Subramanian’s (2008) composite openness index derived from black market premium, tariffs 
and the existence of export marketing boards. 
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column 3 of Table 1.1. As can be seen, our results are robust to these changes and refinements. 
The interaction between aid and ALIGN is significant at the ten percent level at least, with a 
negative coefficient, in all regressions for the overall sample. 
When we split the sample, we do not find any significant differences between the 
coefficients of our variables of interest across the four sample splits. Looking at the coefficients 
of the interaction terms themselves, we find that the effectiveness of aid on growth is reduced by 
ideological misalignment during the Cold War period, in autocracies, when corruption is low, and 
in countries with “good” as well as “bad” economic policies. 
Finally, we replicate our main regressions focusing on early-impact aid, following 
Clemens et al. (2012). Early-impact aid contains those categories of aid that can reasonably be 
expected to affect growth in the short-term, like budget support and program aid and certain 
categories of project aid (e.g., infrastructure investment or support for production in agriculture 
and industry). Clemens et al. calculate disbursements of early-impact aid based on commitment 
data, given the unavailability of sectorally disaggregated aid disbursements for most of the 
sample period. Unfortunately, serious under-reporting of data was also prevalent for sector-
specific commitments until the mid-1990s,
96
 rendering this measure rather noisy. In our case, this 
is aggravated by the fact that we need to disaggregate aid at the donor-recipient-sector level 
rather than the recipient-sector level as in Clemens et al. (2012). Still, we think it is interesting to 
compare our results with those using this alternative measure of aid. We replicated all regressions 
from Tables 1 and 2 replacing total aid with early-impact aid. While we do not show the results in 
tables, we provide a short description of the main results here. 
Overall, our results are substantially weaker when we focus on early-impact aid. In the 
regressions of Table 1.2, we do not find a significant effect of ALIGN on the effectiveness of aid. 
Separately investigating early-impact aid between aligned and non-aligned donor-recipient pairs 
(Table 1.2), we find a significantly negative effect of early-impact aid from non-aligned donors 
once the amount of aid exceeds 0.3 percent of GDP, significant at one percent level. We do not 
find any evidence of differential effects between different pairs of ideological positions among 
the donor and recipient. Overall, the larger noise in the data on early-impact aid leads to weaker 
conclusions, even though the main result of Table 1.2 carries over to early-impact aid. 
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In summary, our results are robust to the inclusion of a number of additional control 
variables and to how we measure aid. We do not find differential effects across four important 




















Table A 1 Definitions and sources 
 
  
Variable Definition Original Source
Aid/GDP Average gross bilateral aid 
disbursements in percent of GDP.
DAC (2012), Table DAC2a
Alignment Aid-weighted average distance in 
political orientation between a recipient 
and donors in period t.
Calculated based on Beck et al. (2001), variable: EXECRLC
GDP p.c. growth     Average annual growth rate of real GDP 
p.c. in constant international dollars.
Penn World Table 6.2 and World Bank (2007) for the year 2005*. Penn World 
Table 7.1 for 2006-2010.
Multilateral Aid/GDP Average gross multilateral disbursements 
in percent of GDP.
DAC (2012), Table DAC2a
Multilateral repayments/GDP Average multilateral repayments in 
percent of GDP.
DAC (2012), Table DAC2a
Bilateral repayments/GDP Average bilateral repayments in percent 
of GDP.
DAC (2012), Table DAC2a
Initial GDP p.c. (log) Natural logarithm of initial GDP p.c. in 
international prices.
Penn World Table 6.2*,  Penn World Table 7.1 for 2006-2010.
Initial life expectancy (log) Natural logarithm of first non-missing 
value in each period of total life 
expectancy.
World Bank (2007)*, World Bank (2012) 
Openness            Wacziarg-Welch's (2008) extension of 
the initial Sachs and Warner (1995) 
openness index.
Wacziarg and Welch (2008), updated by Clemens et al. (2012)*. Extension of this 
index was updated as in Clemens et al. (2012), using IMF Staff Reports and 
Economic Freedom Dataset 2013
Inflation (log)      Natural logarithm of (1+consumer price) 
inflation.
World Bank (2005, 2007, 2012), IMF (2005), Clemens et al. (2012)*
Initial M2/GDP   Money and quasi-money (M2) to GDP. World Bank (2007, 2012)*
Budget Balance/GDP Overall budget balance, including grants, 
measured as cash surplus/deficit to GDP.
World Bank (2005, 2007, 2012), IMF (2005), Clemens et al. (2012)*
Revolutions         Average number of revolutions per 
period.
Banks and Wilson (2012)
Humanitarian Aid Average humanitarian aid received from 
all donors as percent of GDP, averaged 
over the relevant period.
DAC (2012), Table DAC2a
Non-DAC Aid Average gross bilateral aid received from 
China, India, South Africa, Taiwan and 
Saudi Arabia.
AidData: Open Data for International Development; Strange et al. (2013).
http://aiddata.org/
Democracy Dummy for democratic and autocratic 
regimes. Equals 1 if period average 
larger than 0.5, 0 otherwise.
Cheibub et al. (2010)
Inflow of refugees (log) Natural logarithm of the average number 
of refugee inflow in the recipent country. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Data
Civil wars Dummy for existance of civil wars, 
period averages.
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook Version 4-2011
Natural disasters (log) Natural logarithm of estimated damage 
from natural disasters in percent of GDP, 
period averages.
International Disaster Database. http://emdat.be/
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Table A1 (continued) 
 
Notes: * Our source is Clemens et al. (2012), 
http://www.cgdev.org/doc/Working%20Papers/CRBB-Replication-Files.zip. More details (also 
on early-impact aid composition) are provided in “Technical Appendix to Counting chickens 




** Cold War dummy. When we define the indicator to cover one period earlier the difference 
between the periods remains insignificant.  
  
Variable Definition Original Source
Cold War Cold War dummy equals 1 if period is 
earlier than or  same as 1991-1995**, 0 
otherwise.
US Department of State Office of the Historian
http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/endofcoldwar
Good Policy (Openness) Dummy for open and closed economies, 
averaged over period. Equals 1, when 
index larger than 0.5, 0 otherwise.
Wacziarg and Welch (2008), updated by Clemens et al. (2012)*. Extension of this 
index was updated as in Clemens et al. (2012), using Freedom House (2013)  and 
IMF Staff reports for the 2006-2010 period.
Recipient ideology Average party orientation of the chief 
executive of the recipient country (left, 
center, right). Original coding:  Left=3, 
Center=3, Right=1).
Calculated based on Beck et al. (2001), variable: EXECRLC
Corruption ICRG corruption perception index. The 
index ranges from 1 to 6, with higher 
values indicating less corruption. 
International Country Risk Guide. 2012. PRS Group. 
http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx.
FDI Net bilateral foreign direct investment 
from donor countries in percent of GDP.
UNCTAD, Bilateral FDI Statistics 2014 
URL: http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI-Statistics/FDI-Statistics-
Bilateral.aspx
Trade Total bilateral trade (imports plus 
exports) with donor countries in percent 
of GDP.
Barbieri et al. (2009)
Trade-weighted alignment Party orientation of the chief executive 
weighed by the share of bilateral trade.
Authors' own calculation based on the sources
FDI-weighted alignment Party orientation of the chief executive 
weighed by the share of bilateral FDI.
Authors' own calculation based on the sources
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Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
GDP p.c. growth     1.35 3.01 -12.30 10.12
Bilateral Aid to GDP 3.30 3.94 0.01 25.74
Alignment 0.95 0.32 0.04 1.89
Initial GDP p.c. (log) 8.14 0.88 5.85 10.21
Multilateral Repayments to GDP 0.19 0.32 0.00 2.32
Multilateral aid to GDP 1.83 3.16 0.00 19.01
Bilateral repayments to GDP 0.34 0.54 0.00 4.16
Initial life expectancy (log) 62.53 10.25 36.55 79.41
Openness            0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00
Inflation (log)      0.33 0.65 0.00 4.19
Initial M2 to GDP   6.30 14.26 0.00 105.70
Budget Balance to GDP -0.10 0.57 -5.51 2.35
Revolutions         0.27 0.44 0.00 2.60
Humanitarian Aid/GDP 0.318 0.662 0 6.883
New Donor Aid/GDP 0.0237 0.107 0 1.04
Recipient ideology 2.013 0.649 1 3
Trade/GDP 13.288 19.711 0.000 122.242
FDI/GDP 0.525 1.033 -3.452 5.521
Corruption 2.762 0.949 0.000 5.000
Trade-weighted alignment 0.933 0.407 0.000 1.994
FDI-weighted alignment 0.80426 0.5090267 0 2
Democracy 0.505 0.501 0 1
Inflow of refugees (log) 1.916 3.813 0 14.03
Civil wars 0.0615 0.201 0 1
Natural disasters (log) -6.113 4.656 -15.94 0
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Table A3 Regression in levels with country-fixed effects 
 
Notes: The interacted variables are demeaned within each country before we interacted them. The 




            (1)
Aid/GDP            0.133*  
                 [0.067]   
Alignment       -0.868*  
                 [0.443]   
Aid/GDP* Alignment       -0.503** 
                 [0.191]   
Aid lagged?          Yes   
Fixed Effects          Yes   
Interaction demeaned          Yes   
First differenced           No   
Adj. R-Squared 0.313
Number of Countries 68
Number of Observations 375
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Table A4 Tests for Robustness 
 
Notes: Shows the coefficients of the interaction between aid and ALIGN. All regressions include 
the same control variables as Table 1.1. “Democracies” are defined according to Cheibub et al. 
(2010). “Corruption” is the perceived corruption index of ICRG. “Good policy” refers to an index 
considering the black market premium, tariffs and existence of export marketing boards (as used 
in Rajan and Subramanian 2008). *** (**, *) significant at the one (five, ten) percent level. 
  
(1)   
Burnside-Dollar       -0.390** 
Net aid disbursements       -0.521** 
Control for non-DAC aid       -0.650***
Control for humanitarian aid       -0.640***
Control for natural disasters       -0.635***
Control for inflows of refugees       -0.645***
Control for civil wars       -0.646***
Control for trade/GDP and FDI/GDP       -0.677***
Control for trade-weighted and FDI-weighted alignment       -0.642***
Control for regional interactions with aid       -0.675***
Control for multilateral Aid/GDP *Alignment       -0.661***
Control for corruption and democracy       -0.803***
Delta Alignment       -0.323*  
Cold War period       -0.730***
Post-Cold War period -0.368
p-value (F-test for group comparison) [0.319]
Democracies -0.458
Autocracies       -0.687** 
p-value (F-test for group comparison) [0.428]
Corruption high -0.728
Corruption low       -0.695***
p-value (F-test for group comparison) [0.947]
Good policy       -0.684***
No good policy       -0.818*  
p-value (F-test for group comparison) [0.714]
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Table A5 Control for recipient ideology 
 
Notes: The regression includes the same control variables as Table 1.1. *** (**, *) significant at 
the one (five, ten) percent level. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aid/GDP        0.722***        1.239***
                 [0.268]        [0.239]   
Alignment -0.348
                 [0.628]   
Aid/GDP* Alignment       -0.628***
                 [0.173]   
Recipient ideology -0.236 -0.022       -0.523** -0.235
                 [0.259]        [0.301]        [0.263]        [0.261]   
Aid/GDP* Recipient ideology       -0.231*        -0.208** 
                 [0.126]        [0.089]   
Aid from center donors                0.308 0.304
                 [0.293]        [0.291]   
Aid from left donors        0.421***        0.440***
                 [0.127]        [0.125]   
Aid from right donors 0.098 0.114
                 [0.141]        [0.137]   
Ideology first differenced No No No Yes
Adj. R-Squared 0.324 0.344 0.335 0.33
Number of Countries 67 67 67 67
Number of Observations 299 299 299 299
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Table A6 Comparison of means test in aid shares 
 
Notes: Social sectors include: Education, Health, Population, Water and Sanitation, Government 
/Civil Society, Other Social Infrastructure and Services. Private sector includes: Transport and 
Storage, Communication, Energy Generation and Supply, Banking and Financial Services, 
Business and other Services, Agriculture/Fishing, Industry/Mining, Trade/Tourism.  
Mean share of tied, untied and partially tied aid for aligned and not aligned donor recipient pairs
Not aligned Aligned Difference p-Value
Share of tied aid 0.206 0.162 0.0436 0.000
Share of untied aid 0.761 0.799 -0.0381 0.000
Share of partially tied aid 0.0329 0.0384 -0.00548 0.222
Mean share of budget and project aid for aligned and not aligned donor recipient pairs
Share of Budget Aid 0.391 0.327 0.0642 0.068
Share of Project Aid 0.957 0.956 0.00105 0.860
Mean share of social and private sector aid by left/left and right/right pairs
Social Aid Shares 0.493 0.385 0.107 0.199
Private Aid Shares 0.362 0.493 -0.13 0.178
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Table A7 Political alignment and growth controlled for tied aid, 1975-2010, OLS 
   
Notes: The regression includes the same control variables as Table 1.1. *** significant at the one 
percent level. 
  
            (1)   
Aid/GDP            0.840***
                 [0.202]   
Alignment -0.582
                 [0.529]   
Aid/GDP*Alignment       -0.644***
                 [0.180]   
Bilateral  repayments/GDP -0.477
                 [0.323]   
Multilateral Aid/GDP -0.056
                 [0.126]   
Multilateral repayments/GDP -0.339
                 [0.721]   
Share of Tied Aid -0.046
                 [0.110]   
Share of Untied Aid 0.030
                 [0.078]   
Aid lagged?          Yes   
First difference?          Yes   
Adj. R-Squared 0.335
Number of Countries 67





Table B1 Alternative measures of differences: Column 5, Table 2.1 
  
  
Dependant variable: ΔGrowth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Aid -0.345 -0.596 0.121 0.095 0.259        0.263*  0.224
                 [0.464]        [0.887]        [0.186]        [0.995]        [0.158]        [0.156]        [0.138]   
Aid-adjusted genetic distance (AwGD)       -1.073**       -1.105**       -1.033**       -0.847** -0.594 -0.577       -0.983** 
                 [0.441]        [0.446]        [0.436]        [0.426]        [0.428]        [0.429]        [0.441]   
Aid*AwGD       -0.176**       -0.268***       -0.152*        -0.220** -0.169 -0.184       -0.188** 
                 [0.080]        [0.101]        [0.089]        [0.094]        [0.149]        [0.146]        [0.082]   
DELF  -0.424
                 [1.066]   
Aid*DELF 0.791
                 [0.556]   
Language (distance, aid-weighted) 1.422
                 [1.862]   
Aid*Language 1.037
                 [1.029]   
Religion  (distance, aid-weighted) 0.265
                 [0.428]   
Aid*Religion 0.282
                 [0.221]   
Ethnicity (distance, aid-weighted)        -3.029***
                 [1.032]   
Aid*Ethnicity 0.22
                 [1.083]   
Political Ideology (distance, aid-weighted)       -0.919** 
                 [0.423]   
Adj. R-Squared 0.294 0.293 0.294 0.304 0.321 0.313 0.268
Number of Countries 66 66 66 66 66 66 69
Number of Observations 378 378 378 378 297 297 391
OLS panel estimation in first differences: country fixed effects. All regressions include period dummies. Aid denotes gross bilateral aid as percent of recipient's 
GDP. Controls are:  initial GDP p.c. (log), initial life expectancy (log), openness, inflation (log), initial M2/GDP, budget balance/GDP, revolutions. Significance 
levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Dependant variable: ΔGrowth (1) (2) (3)
Aid -0.177 -0.441 -0.496
                 [0.517]        [0.500]        [0.488]   
Aid-adjusted genetic distance (AwGD) 0.72 0.399        0.773** 
                 [0.520]        [0.386]        [0.373]   
Aid*AwGD       -0.578***       -0.562***       -0.571***
                 [0.185]        [0.180]        [0.188]   
Aid*Authority 0.031
                 [0.246]   
Authority  -0.48
                 [0.295]   
Aid *Well-being        0.351*  
                 [0.204]   
Well-being 0.203
                 [0.448]   
Adj. R-Squared 0.334 0.329 0.328
Number of Countries 42 42 42
Number of Observations 152 152 152
OLS panel estimation in first differences: country fixed effects. All regressions include period dummies. Aid 
denotes gross bilateral aid as percent of recipient's GDP. Controls are:  initial GDP p.c. (log), initial life 
expectancy (log), openness, inflation (log), initial M2/GDP, budget balance/GDP, revolutions as well as 
multilateral aid, multilateral and bilateral repayments. Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.1, Column 6 Observations Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max
GDP p.c. growth     378 1.55 3.05 -12.30 10.12
Aid 378 3.01 3.87 0.01 26.69
Aid-adjusted genetic distance (AwGD) 378 1.02 0.53 0.06 2.22
Initial GDP p.c. (log) 378 8.12 0.87 5.34 10.27
Multilateral Repayments 378 0.16 0.30 0.00 2.08
Multilateral aid 378 1.68 3.07 0.00 19.01
Bilateral repayments 378 0.30 0.51 0.00 4.16
Initial life expectancy (log) 378 61.68 10.06 36.55 79.41
Openness            378 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
Inflation (log)      378 0.31 0.61 0.00 4.19
Initial M2 to GDP   378 5.07 12.92 0.00 105.70
Budget Balance to GDP 378 -0.09 0.51 -5.51 2.35
Revolutions         378 0.26 0.41 0.00 2.60
GDP p.c. growth     378 1.55 3.05 -12.30 10.12
Aid 378 3.01 3.87 0.01 26.69
Western Education(leader) 378 0.32 0.42 0.00 1.00
Education Abroad (leader) 378 0.62 0.43 0.00 1.00
Education Level (leader) 378 6.16 1.14 3.00 8.00
Initial GDP p.c. (log) 378 8.12 0.87 5.34 10.27
Multilateral Repayments 378 0.16 0.30 0.00 2.08
Multilateral aid 378 1.68 3.07 0.00 19.01
Bilateral repayments 378 0.30 0.51 0.00 4.16
Initial life expectancy (log) 378 61.68 10.06 36.55 79.41
Openness            378 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
Inflation (log)      378 0.31 0.61 0.00 4.19
Initial M2 to GDP   378 5.07 12.92 0.00 105.70
Budget Balance to GDP 378 -0.09 0.51 -5.51 2.35
Revolutions         378 0.26 0.41 0.00 2.60
Table 2.2, Column 4
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Table B4 Variable Definition and Sources 
 
Variable Definition Sources
Aid Average gross bilateral aid disbursements in percent 
of GDP.
DAC (2012), Table DAC2a
 Aid-adjusted genetic distance 
(AwGD)
Weighted genetic distance between two populations, 
time since two populations split apart.
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009)
Western education Dummy variable if leader has been educated either in 
the US or the UK (in the analysis it is a continous 
variable due to period average).
Dreher et al. (2013b)
Education abroad Dummy variable if leader has been educated outside 
of home country  (in the analysis it is a continous 
variable due to period average).
Dreher et al. (2013b)
Education level Categorial variable on the level of leaders educated 
stating from illiterate to doctoral level (in the analysis 
continous variable due to period averages).
Dreher et al. (2013b)
GDP p.c. growth     Average annual growth rate of real GDP p.c. in 
constant international dollars.
Penn World Table 6.2 and World Bank 
(2007) for the year 2005. Penn World 
Table 7.1 for 2006-2010.
Multilateral aid Average gross multialetral disbursements in percent 
of GDP.
DAC (2012), Table DAC2a
Multilateral repayments Average multilateral repayments in percent of GDP. DAC (2012), Table DAC2a
Bilateral repayments Average bilateral repayments in percent of GDP. DAC (2012), Table DAC2a
Initial GDP p.c. (log) Natural logarithm of initial GDP p.c. in international 
prices.
Penn World Table 6.2,  Penn World Table 
7.1 for 2006-2010.
Initial life expectancy (log) Natural logarithm of first non-missing value in each 
period of total life expectancy.
World Bank (2007), World Bank (2012) 
Openness            Wacziarg-Welch (2008) extension of the initial Sachs 
and Warner (1995) openness index, based on black 
market premium, average tariff rates, export 
marketing board, socialist regime and etc.
Wacziarg and Welch (2008), updated by 
Clemens et al. (2012). Extension of this 
index was updated as in Clemens et al. 
(2012), using Economic Freedom Score 
from Fraser Institute (2013)  and IMF Staff 
reports for the 2006-2010 period.Inflation (log)      Natural logarithm of (1+consumer price) inflation. World Bank (2005, 2007, 2012), IMF 
(2005), Clemens et al. (2012)
Initial M2/GDP   Money and quasi-money (M2) to GDP. World Bank (2007, 2012)
Budget Balance/GDP Overall budget balance, including grants. Measured as 
cash surplus/deficit to GDP.
World Bank (2005, 2007, 2012), IMF 
(2005), Clemens et al. (2012)
Revolutions         Average number of revolutions per period.  Banks and Wilson (2012)
Variables for Robustness tests
Humanitarian aid Average humanitarian aid received from all donors as 
percent of GDP, averaged over the relevant period.
DAC (2012), Table DAC2a
Rest bilateral aid Average gross bilateral aid received from recent DAC 
member and non-member countries. (United Arab 
Emirates, Cyprus, Czech Republic Estonia Hungry 
Island Israel Kuwait Lithuenia Latvia Poland Romania 
Slovak Republic Slovenia Thailand Turkey).
DAC (2012), Table DAC2a
Democracy Continous variable (-2, 2), unified measure of 
democracy.
Pemstein et al. (2013)
Effective Executive The person exercising primary influence in the shaping 
of the major decisions, affecting the nation's internal 
and external affairs (Monarch, President, Premier, 
Military or Other-communist regimes or ineffective 
leader).
 Banks and Wilson (2012)
Head of State Head of the state (Monarch, Premier, President, 
Military or Other-hard to identify).
 Banks and Wilson (2012)
Political alignment Aid-weighted average distance in political ideology 
between a recipient and donors in period t.
Dreher et al. (2013b). Calculated based on 
























Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Growth 257 1.57 3.22 -17.99 12.77
Aid 257 3.62 4.34 0.01 26.69
Remittances/GDP 257 0.42 0.24 0.07 1.90
Initial GDP p.c. (log) 257 8.10 0.92 5.34 10.21
Multilateral repayments 257 0.23 0.34 0.00 2.08
Multilateral aid 257 2.20 3.61 0.00 19.01
Bilateral repayments 257 0.38 0.59 0.00 4.16
Initial life expectancy 257 62.69 10.54 36.55 79.41
Openness 257 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00
Inflation (log) 257 0.35 0.71 0.00 4.19
Initial M2/GDP 257 7.56 15.23 0.00 105.70
Budget balance/GDP 257 -0.11 0.61 -5.51 2.35
Revolutions 257 0.28 0.46 0.00 2.60
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Table C2 Definition of variables and sources 
 
*Online access to Clemens et al. (2012) supplementary material: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-
0297.2011.02482.x/suppinfo 




Aid Average gross bilateral aid disbursements in percent of 
GDP.
DAC (2012), Table DAC2a.
DonQual: remittances/GDP Workers' remittances and compensation of employees, 
paid as percent of donor's GDP.
World Bank (2013).World Development Indicators.
Growth Average annual growth rate of real GDP p.c. in constant 
international dollars.
Clemens et al. (2012).* Penn World Table 7.1 for 2006-2010. 
Multilateral aid Average gross multialetral disbursements in percent of 
recipient's GDP.
DAC (2012), Table DAC2a.
Multilateral repayments Average multilateral repayments in percent of recipient's 
GDP.
DAC (2012), Table DAC2a.
Bilateral repayments Average bilateral repayments in percent of recipient's 
GDP.
DAC (2012), Table DAC2a.
Initial GDP p.c. (log) Natural logarithm of initial GDP p.c. in international 
prices.
Clemens et al. (2012).** Penn World Table 7.1 for 2006-2010.
Initial life expectancy Number of years of first non-missing value in each 
period of total life expectancy.
Clemens et al. (2012).** World Bank (2012). 
Openness            Wacziarg-Welch (2008) extension of the initial Sachs 
and Warner (1995) openness index, based on black 
market premium, average tariff rates, export marketing 
board, socialist regime and etc.
Wacziarg and Welch (2008), updated by Clemens et al. (2012).* 
Extension of this index has been updated as in Clemens et al. 
(2012) using Economic Freedom Data (2013)  and IMF Staff 
reports for the 2006-2010 period.
Inflation (log)      Natural logarithm of (1+consumer price) inflation. Clemens et al. (2012).** World Bank (2012). 
Initial M2/GDP   Money and quasi-money (M2) as percent of GDP. Clemens et al. (2012).** World Bank (2012). 
Budget balance/GDP Overall budget balance, including grants. Measured as 
cash surplus/deficit in percent of GDP.
Clemens et al. (2012).** World Bank (2012). 
Revolutions         Average number of revolutions per period. Clemens et al. (2012).** Banks and Wilson (2012).
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Table C 3 List of aid recipient countries  
 
1 Argentina       36 Morocco     
2 Burkina Faso     37 Madagascar   
3 Bulgaria       38 Mexico     
4 Bolivia       39 Mali     
5 Brazil       40 Malawi     
6 Botswana       41 Malaysia     
7 Chile       42 Nigeria     
8 China       43 Nicaragua   
9 Cote d'Ivoire     44 Pakistan     
10 Cameroon     45 Panama     
11 Congo, Rep.     46 Peru     
12 Colombia       47 Philippines   
13 Costa Rica     48 Papua New Guinea   
14 Cyprus       49 Poland     
15 Dominican Rep.     50 Paraguay     
16 Algeria       51 Romania     
17 Ecuador       52 Senegal     
18 Egypt, Arab Rep.     53 Singapore     
19 Ethiopia       54 Sierra Leone   
20 Gabon       55 El Salvador   
21 Ghana       56 Syrian Arab Rep. 
22 Gambia, The     57 Togo     
23 Guatemala     58 Thailand     
24 Honduras       59 Trinidad and Tobago   
25 Hungary       60 Tunisia     
26 Indonesia       61 Turkey     
27 India       62 Tanzania     
28 Iran, Islamic Rep.     63 Uganda     
29 Israel       64 Uruguay     
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30 Jamaica       65 Venezuela   
31 Jordan       66 Yemen, Rep.   
32 Kenya       67 South Africa   
33 Korea, Rep.     68 Congo, Dem. Rep.   
34 Liberia       69 Zambia     
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